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RAISON D’ETRE 
“In another context, I have said that the Boards are where the buck 
Stops In our System, which means that the Boards - as far as the 
Individual Centers are concerned - are the final authority. 
.’ - - 
But the System Is In a real dilemma when a Board falls. What do we 
do, except-to wring our hands and withhold our money, and that’s not good 
enough because & are wedded to the substance of these Institutions. 
Therefore, I would like to say to the Chairmen of the Boards and the 
members of their Boards that, since you are the ultimate authority, the 
responslblllty on you Is considerable. 
The responslblllty on you is considerable because much of the Board 
Is not nominated by anybody else, but by the Board members themselves. 
So for all practical purposes. you have self-pirpttuating Boards. And if 
these self-perpetuating Boards don’t rise up to the challenge [of their 
rtsponslblllty for our Centers], then clearly, either the concepts will 
have to change, or our System will be weakened very substantially.’ 
Shahld Husain. CGIAR Chairman, 
at International Centre’s Week, 
1986. 
* . , 
sm¶E THOUGHTS TOWARD E?JsuRING THE succEssFuLl PERFoRHmcE 
OF BOARDS IN THE CGIAR SYSTEM 
by 
John L. Dillon* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The core of the CCXAR Is Its set’of International Agricultural 
Research Centres. Each of these Centres Is autonomous: each is also. a 
.not-for-profit organization dependent for Its budget upon the goodwill of 
the CXIAR and Its donors. Responsibility for the overall management and 
performance of each Centre lies with Its Board. Good performance by 
Centre Boards I$ thus crucial to the continued success of the CZGIAR System. 
Hou the Board of ,a CGIAR Centre might successfully meet its 
responsibilities while maintaining the delicate balance between managerial 
autonomy and financial dependency is the subject of this lucubration. The 
orientation is practical. The high ground of principle, philosophy and 
prose about Boards Is already well taken by Lowell Hardln’s paper “Roles, 
Relationships and Responslbllltles of Trustees of International 
Agricultural Research Centers” which was apprdved by the CGIAR at Its 
November 1984 meeting. Concern here is largely with the nitty-gritty of 
Board operation and ways of endeavourlng to overcome the constraints that 
Boards face In their work. Mundane though It be, this is an important 
matter. The Centres and the System were created on the great humanitarian 
motive of overcoming hunger. Success in this can be achieved only If 
Boards operate successfully ln the recognition that they bear a major 
responslblllty to foster a System conceived as a practical way of giving 
meaning to the Ideal of a hunger-free world. This motivation must be 
sustained; without It, the System could deteriorate to just’another 
bureaucratic quagmire. 
. 
, 
*Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management, University 
of New England. Armldale. N.S.W. 2351, Australia. Responsibility for the 
thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper. as for any factual errors, 
lies with the akhor alone. 
SIX provisos apply to the present paper. First, It assumes ‘. 
familiarity with the Hardln paper referred to above. Second. it generally 
makes no attempt to allow for the peculiarities that may apply to 
particular Centres. Third, It is written en famllle from the perspective 
of Board operation as part of the CG family of Boards, Directors General 
and their staffs, TRC. the Secretariats and the Group. Fourth, although 
much that Is said here Is seemingly obvious, indeed mundane, experience 
indicates that such matters play a major but often overlooked role in the 
effectiveness of Board operation. Fifth, nothing suggested here should be 
seen as ultimate truth: the very progress &era&d by ‘the Cent’res will 
necessitate constant re-thinking as to what Boards must do to keep the CG 
System lively, responsive, relevant and dynamic. Sixth, being one 
person’s thoughts - and an Anglo-Saxon (with a touch of Irish Celt) at 
that - the paper is doubtless both somewhat Idiosyncratic and biased to an 
Anglo-Saxon way of doing things. 
successful Board operation prfmarfly depends on having conpe tent 
a&be~s who recognize their responsfbf 11 ties, are adequate1 y Informed, 
do their h wework and work as a team under effective leadershlp to ensure 
that policies and procedures are ti place to discharge Board 
rcsponsibflltles effectdvely. Conversely, to the extent that a Board 
faces Internal constraints imposed by having incompetent, Inappropriate, 
uninterested, uninformed, unavailable or disruptive members and lacks 
satisfactory leadership. It will fall in Its responsiblllties and Ill . 
serve its Director General, Its Centre, the CC System, the donors, and the 
developing world. Too, a Board’s effectiveness may not only suffer 
because of such internal constraints but also because of external 
constraints imposed by Its Centre’s By-laws and other aspects or elements 
of the CC System. 
?!ore discursively, let me now elaborate on this complicated mesh of 
factors that determines Board effectiveness - a mesh so interwoven that 
trying to put the discussion into scxne sort of order is like trying to do 
Rubik’s cube in the dark. At any rate, the attempt Is made under three 
major headings. 
w 
Board responsibilities and accountability are first 
considered (Section 2). Board membership needs and structure in order to _. 
meet these~responslblllties are’ then explored (Section 3). Finally, the 
matter of a Board’s functioning is taken up (Section 4). 
2. BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
. 
Basic to effective Board performance is an understanding by each and 
every Board member of’both the general purpose of a Board and, second, of . 
his or her general duties as a member. 1; these two aspects,. ‘the Board of 
a fXIAR Centre Is no different from the Board of any autonomous 
not-for-profit organization. 
Though well covered by Hardin (1984). the responsibilities and 
accountability of Board members are restated here since they are so 
Important to successful Board performance. As well as making the present 
paper more self-contained. this restatement gives the opportunity to add a 
‘few things and also to rephrase Hardin somewhat more bluntly for the 
benefit of new members without Board experience who, lnltlally, may be 
quite bewildered as to what It means to be a member. An appreciation of 
Board responslbllltles and accountability Is, of course, also essential to 
the specification of Board membership, structure and functioning. 
2.1. Purpose of the Board 
The general purpose of the Board Is to ensure that: 
(il The mandate of the Centre is feasfble, pertinent and acceptable. 
(il/ The Centre has objectives, programs and plans that are 
consistent kfth Its mandate and wAth the goals and purposes of 
the CCXAR System of whfch It is a part. 
(fill The Centre Is managed effectively by its Board-dppolnred 
Director General in hamony wft.9 the agreed objectlves, prcgrans 
and budgets, and in accordance wfth legal and regulatory 
reg3lrements. 
(IV) The fUturc h&&b of the.Cenuc and of &he CCXAR Syst& of ~@d! 
‘_ It fs d part ds not feopardIzed by exposing dts financial 
resources, Its staff or fts credibIllty to Imprudent risks. 
2.2. Principal Duties of the Board 
Consequent upon the above four aspects of a Board’s purpose, &he 
ptlncipal duties of a Board Involve: 
ongoing review of the appropriateness af the‘cenue's -date; 
deflnftfon of objectives and .approvaJ of plans afn#d at meeting the 
mandate; * 
specifdcatdon of policAes to be followed by the Director enera. In 
pursuing the specifbd objectIves; 
appointment of theDIrector Gemral; 
approval of the Centre's brodd organlzathnal frammmrkt 
wtitorlng of the performance of the Dfrector General; 
rronitoring of &he achlevemmt of the Centre's objectives; 
disadssal of the Director Cenerd ii hb or her performdnce IS 
Inadequate; . 
msurance of the Centre’s cost effectiveness, fAnanc:al Integrity and 
atxxxmtab~lfty; 
appotntmznt of an external au& tor and approval of an annual audit 
plan: 
dpp~0va.l of an Investment policy and the wnjtoring of its 
LzapleanzntatIon; 
overseefng of major borrowing, major expansion Including the 
acgufs~tlon of major equipment and facllltfes, and the dfsposal of 
0ajor assets; 
determinatfon of prlorltles relating to major elements within and 
between the Centre's programs: 
approval of the Centre's Program and Budget: 
WProval of personnel policies including scales of salaries and 
benef;its; . 
(p/ deterarinatl& of tie term of employment of the Dlrecror General; 
, l -, 
fqJ ensurdna of wapfiana wdth relevant legal and regulatdrY . . 
requfremen ts; 
frI approval of &be Centre 's Annual Report; 
fsJ ensurance that Board members have no cozzfl~ct of fnterest; 
ft) ensurance that &he Centre behaves in accordance c<itk System-wide 
(UJ 
Iv) 
(Ul 
polfcles laid down by the CGIAR; 
ensurance that due consl.deration 1s given to the rzcommendat;iOns and 
suggestf ons made by CCIAR-approved reviews pertfnent t3 &he Cenrre's 
operatfon and actJvitIes; 
as occasion demands, representdng the Cen‘ue and,'uh en 'ntd be, 
SerVfng as d bridge between the Ctmtre and the rest , II? the CCIAR 
System; and 
wndtoring and evaluation of the performance of Boara mxnbers ami'fit' 
IdentlffcatIon, selection and lnductlon of new Board i mnbers. 
. 
The above duties Involve four matters of implementatio, I (viz., 
appointment of a Director General, appointment of an externd :l auditor, 
appointment of Board members and representation of the Centr e). These ar, 
c~lemented by a variety of duties involving elements of foi rniUlatlon# 
approval. review and.monltorlng. Overall, the most important : declslon a 
Board may face Is the choice of a Director General. success in this* by 
virtue of the advice and guidance a good Director General can i?ro’vl~~ 
will ensure the basis for carrying out all other responslblll~ ties of the 
Board. Beyond the appointment of Its Director Geaeral, perhaL ~5 the 
Board’s most important dkles - at least in a forn\al sense - a re appro>+: 
of the Centre’s Program and Budget and appointment of the extei ma1 
auditor. This Is not, however, to decry the importance of the Board’s 
other responslbllltles. Successful Board operation implies th.31: all the 
listed duties must be well met. 
As suggested by Selcuk 0zged:z (C:xnmittee of:’ ward Chairpers.=nsk 
19861, duties of the Board can be summ,2rlzed by sitylng that the Ba’- 3rd: 
(i) has respcnsibllity For policy formlJlatlon and overseehg of it:; 
implementation by the Board-appointed Director Genc:ral: and (ii) she. 11d 
practlse sel/-management. 
ft is not the functbn af the Board to manage the Centre. -That ff 
the job of the Director General. In doing so, he or she will have 
management functions aimed at ensuring the Implementation of Board policy 
through mechanisms and procedures encompassing the functional areas of: 
(a) human resource management (salary and benefits, performance, 
contracts, etc. of professional and support staff). 
(b) financial management (financial planning and budgeting, resource 
allocation, rnqnltoring and auditing, etc.). - 
(c) Information management (ccaanm ications’, cwpiitcr iervices, library, 
etc. 1.. 
(d) administration (operational procedures, physical plant, stores, etc.). 
(e) external relations (with host-governments, client countries, other 
Ccntrcs. TAC, etc.). 
(f) program management (strategic planning. organizational structure and 
management of activities). 
2.3. Members Duties of Lovalty and Care 
In ensuring that the Board achieves Its purpos6, nmubers should be 
guided by a duty of loyalty and d duty of care. Under his or her duty of 
loyalty, the Board member as a trustee has a fiduciary duty to deal 
fairly, openly and In good faith with the Cen&re. Conflfcts of Interests 
arut be dvolded. Under hfs or her duty of care, the Board member is 
expected to exeriise such care and skill as a person of ordAna.ry prudence 
wuld exercise in dealIn w1tJ1 his or her onn property. 
In performing his or her work as a Board member, It is generally 
accepted that the member can: 
(1) delegate his or her authority to subcommittees of the Board so 
long as he or she monitors the performance of such subcommittees. 
! I:) rely on information provided by others having relevant expertise. 
(iii) receive remuneration. 
* 
“The motion has been made and seconded that we stick our hradr in the sand.” 
I . . 1 
(Iv) avoid liability for simple negligence In the managemeit of the . . 
organization as long as the negligence Is not gross and the 
member acts with reasonable care. 
2.4. Members’ Leqal Accountability and Liability 
A Board member Is legally accountable under the laws of the country 
ln which the Centre is Incorporated, taking account of special statutes 
that may relate to such incorporation. Insofar as these laws and statutes .- 
of Incorporation vary between the CCIAR Ceritres, each Board might wisely 
ascertain the legal provisions that may apply to the liability of Its 
members. Guideline standards relative to legal llablllty that typically 
apply to Board members of non-profit corporations such as the Centres are 
that: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
since the Board is responsible for the corporation, members can be 
held liable for a breach of fiduciary care If they fall to attend . 
meetings or to monitor the affairs of the organization. 
Board members have a duty to ensure that the corporation keeps 
correct r&ords adequate to Its purpose.. 
business decisions made in good faith but which turn out poorly do 
nck constitute grounds for personal liability. 
Wrd members can be held personally liable when they vote for or 
assent to improper distribution of the corporation’s assets or when 
they fail to dissent In writing when Impropriety occurs. 
There are three means by which Board members may be protected against 
the risk of legal llablllty. These are. first and most importantly, by 
the articulation of policies and procedures to ensure good performance: 
second, through indemnification by the corporation: and, third. by 
liability Insurance I 
So much for the general legal framework. In practice, legal 
lldblllty of CCIAR 3oard members would seem to be el&er a non-issue or 
largely non-enf$rceable. It Is likely to be a non-issue In that the 
, : 
country of incorporation of a Centrc may have little direct financial 
stake or legal interest In the financial performance of the Centre while* 
relative to research performance, judgement can never be clearcut. 
mn-enforceability will generally occur because the majority of Board 
members are typicaily not residents of the country of incorporation. 
.- 
At the same time, poor performance by a Board or major troubles in a 
Centrt can have significant repercussions on the standing of the Centre 
. and on the goodwill of donors towards the Centre and the CGIAR System as a 
whole. For these reasons, It Is very lmporiant that members should 
recognlze.their accountability and meet their responsibilities within the 
axAR system. -In turn, by doing so, the Board and Its members vi11 play 
their part In ensuring that the System meets Its goals. 
2.5. Members General Accountabilltv 
No Board amber, fn the perfonnanc e of his or her duty as a Board 
mxber, should act as a representative of some third party. There are 
only tn, parties Involved: the Board and the Individual member. Each 
manher qua member should act ln his or her Indtvldual capac1ty.f THIS 
vlw0 it might be noted, is stronger than that expressed by Hardin (1984. 
p.7). He would allow cx officio members to serve as representatives. 
TO Put it colloquially, when they are acting as members of the Board, 
members should wear a Board hat and not the hat of soQIe constituency or 
outside entity - be It a country, a region or a professional discipline - 
under whose nmination or because of which they may have come to be on the 
Board. In this sense, Centre Boards do not contain representatives and It 
l Judged by comments received on the initial draft of this pap&, this 
statement (and Its following elaboration) excited the greatest interest. 
Some saw It as either plain wrong, ill-conceived. culturally biased or 
idiosyncratic: others as idealistic and Impractical: and others as 
some thing that needed to be said and stressed even more. I have 
compromised by sticking to my opinion. 
. . 
Is misleading - despite c-n usage - to refer to them as contdlnlng _. 
representatives (even “host-country representatives”) other than of the 
Board Itself. 
Uhat members do Is bring to the Board particular knowledge and 
perspectives which are seen as relevant to the Board by the constituency 
or outside entity from which their membership Is derived. This 
constituency or outside entity should be seen as putting Its faith In an 
Individual capable of serving well as a .Board member, not as a . . 
representative acting under instruction. Only In' this ‘way can'the 
autonomy of the Board be preserved and artificial divisions be avoided. 
All the above 1s clearcut with respect to at-large (i.e., 
non-regionally restricted and non-national) members and CC-nominee 
members. It may not be so with regionally restricted and, particularly, 
host-country members, especially If these members are designated ln the 
By-laws as ex officio. It Is doubtless true that host-country members are 
frequently regarded by their government as Its representatives on the 
Board in the sense of being subject to government instructions In their 
Board work and, in the extreme, giving access.to confidential Board 
material. This Is particularly so If such members owe their presence to 
the host government. It Is also true that such members have generally 
served their Boards very well and their status with government has been 
very Important to the operation of their Centres. From the Board's 
perspective, however, while such members are expected to Inform the Board * 
of their government's views and concerns (this being a major reason they 
are on the Board), their membership qua member Is as Individuals, not as 
directed representatives. In this sense, their accountability 1s to the 
Board and themselves, just as Is true for other members. This, of course. 
does not deny the fact that If their government 1s unhappy with their 
performance it may have the right to replace them. Tant pls. 
Without being subject to instruction. all Board members should, 
however. see themselves as accountable to: 
CL 
(a) the Centre’s benef iclarlcs . 
(b) the Centre’s donors. 
(c) the Centre’s Director General and staff. 
(d) the host country. 
(e) the CGIAR System (i.e., the Group, TAC and the Secretariats). 
(f) the public at large. 
There will always be a degree of conflict between sane of these 
,dlznenslons of broad.accotitablllty. Board mfmbers-must resolve such 
conflict according to their own judgement applled‘to the particular 
clrcMPstances Involved. 
In sum, as Hardln (1984. p.8) puts It, Board embers *are expected 
to be enlfghtened, international servants who by their wise and prudent 
actions endeavor to advance the interests and well-being of the groups and 
indIvfdua.Is that the centers and the CCIAR system serve.' Implicit in 
this is the responslblllty for Boards to speak out on Issues which they 
bcIievc the System should address.* 
. 
l In a letter to me of Hay 1987, Bill Xashler has conrmented on this 
matter as follows: 
‘One issue to be considered Is the leadership position of the Center 
In the System. This should be a joint responsibility of the Director 
General and of the Board. It has been my view for quite some time that 
the true leadership for research directions reposes In the Centers. I 
recognize that the TAC as well as others within the CCIAR system play an 
Important role In charting the course which existing Centers. or others 
that might come into being, should follow. Yet, I cannot think of more 
involved and capable entitles than the Centers themselves. They see the 
realities clearly because they are on the ground, work with these 
realities and see the changes which take place both because of their work 
and because of other factors brought about by time. people. nature, 
environment etc. I believe very strongly and deeply that Centers’ 
Ranagement and Boards must, If their accountability is to be more than 
just an empty phrase, cOme out whenever circumstances dictate and speak 
out frankly and freely about issues which the CGIAR and Its Centers should 
address. This would involve such ticklish yet crucial issues as 
suggesting changes in mandate and changes in research directions.” 
“Could you go over that once again, Ravi? 
Just in case any of us don’t understand it.” 
2.6. lover of the Board 
Such expectation of members’ performance may also well be viewed in 
the general context of power in and around organizations, a fascinating 
and pertinent analysis of which (drawn to my attention by John Nickel) is 
given by Hintzberg (1983).* He distinguishes the “external a”d internal 
codlitions’. The Board represents the formal power of the organization’s 
external coalition while the chief executive officer (I.e., the Director 
General) represents-the formal power of the internal coalition. .- 
In this context, Boards might be of three basic types: those that 
exist primarily #to exercise some kind of control over the organization; 
those that are designed primarily to serve the organization: and those 
that are merely a facade and exist only because of legal requirements. 
tilntzberg postulates that to the extent to which an organization Is 
autonanous and relatively independent of its environment, it can perhaps 
afford the Board as a facade. But to the extent to which an organization 
is dependent on its environment, the composition of Its Board must be 
designed accordingly. Obviously, on this analysis, CGIAR Boards cannot 
afford to be a facade - they are too dependent.on the System and must be 
structured accordingly, as discussed In Section 3 below.’ Rather, CGIAR 
Boards best correspond to a rixture of Mntzberg’s first two categories 
with a primary dim of serving the Centre and a secondary aim of exercising 
control. 
l Mnttberg’s view of Boards is but one of many to be found In the 
literature on corporate organization and management. Pertinent reference 
to sane of these views Is to be found In Selcuk Ozgedlz’s (1987) review of 
the lessons on CGIAR Board performance to be drawn from the first round of 
External Management Reviews. Drawing these together, he postulates a 
conceptual model Involving organizational culture, governance and 
ltader~hlp, resource management, program management and output. No doubt 
because great minds think alike. none of his assessment appears to be in 
conflict with the present paper. 
Mntzberg (1983, Ch. 6) argues that the Board exercises control over 
the organkzarion: by selecting 1~s chief executive offlcer; by e%erclsi;fg 
direct control during periods of crisis; and by revieulng managerI& 
performance fn the light of Board-establIshed policy. Board review of 
performme takes place at three levels: legitlmfzing, auditing and 
directing. He states: "A board can temper the actions of management 
lmplicltly, much as bees in the vicinity temper the actions of someone 
picking flowers. As long as the directors [I.e., members of the board] or 
the bees are not dlqturbed, one [I.e., management] proceeds unimpeded. 
But upsetting them can have disastrous conseiuences” (M.ntzbergT.1983, p. 
76). . 
, 
In discussing the real power of the Board, tIlntzberg (1983, p. 76) 
retm to the bee analogy by stating: “.. If the bee does indeed choose 
to dttdck, It gets to sting only once. And the same 1s true more or less 
for the board of directors.’ He contends (p. 78) that, because 
managcment Is so much better informed than external Board members, “Board 
approval of management decisions and performance under normal 
circumstances tends to be a foregone conclusion’. After reviewing a 
number of studies of many canpanlcs, he conclu.des (p. 78) that “when a 
board does Indeed have control, Its real power amounts to the capacity to 
dismiss and appoint the chief executive officer - and to the CEO’s 
knowledge of that fact. That Is all.” He also suggests that this power 
cannot be used too often, since no organization can afford to have its 
chief executive officer dismissed frequently by a Board intent on 
consolidating its power base. When this does occur It is an opportunity 
. 
for a general examination of the goals and policy of the organization by 
both the Board Itself and, acre critically, the external coalition. The 
Board is also seen as serving an Important function as a sounding board 
for the chief executive officer who ‘occupies a lonesome post: from time 
to time he must resolve matters in which he needs counsel, yet may be 
reluctant to discuss these matters with subordinates” (Mintzberg, 1983. p. 
85,). 
Mlntzkrg postulates that the degree of Influence of the external 
coalition (and thus the degree to which the Board serves that ctilltion or 
the organization) depends on whether the coalition is dominated by one 
party, divided, or passive (with “divided” defined as having a few actors 
and ‘passive” as many). In the case of the CC Centres, the divided 
definition seems to apply best, since the external coalition is made up of 
only the CGIAR, TX, and the client countries. 
One of the chief exktlve officer’s most Important responsibilities, . .w 
and source of power, as argued by Mntzberg, Ps the’-system of ideology by 
which he or. she infuses the organization with value. builds purpose, and 
thus transforms a neutral body Into a committed polity. The 
organizational ideology generates an “esprit de corps”, a “sense of 
mission’. He states (p. 152) that “The roots of the ideology are planted 
when a group of individuals band together around a leader and work through 
a sense of mission to found an organization. The ideology then develops 
over time through the establishment of traditions. And finally, an 
existing ideology is reinforced through the identification of new members 
with the organization and its system of beliefs’. 
3. BOARD MEMBERSHIP 
3.1. Structure by Field of Expertise 
Board membership. within the constraints Imposed by Centre By-laws. 
needs to be carefully structured in terms of expertise relative to 
science, financial management and business administration. 
Every Board should have at least one or two members whose background 
1s not ptimarlly in the uea of agr1cu.l ture or science but is prlmarlly ln 
such areas as fInancla1 management and business admfnistratlon. The 
benefit of such members lies In the business, financial and organizational 
perspectives they can bring to the Board’s deliberations, thereby 
ccmplementlng thegclentlfic and agricultural expertise of their fellow 
W&M=. If such members have an agricultural or science background as . 
~11, that ti a bonus. Prime candidates would be sudcessful executives 
from industry and commerce. Attracting such hardheaded captains of 
industry or commerce to serve as Board members may be difficult but, given 
the goodness of the cause and the challenges involved, might not ,be as 
difficult as folklore suggests. To date, it would seem, the need for such 
expertise has not.been sufficiently recognized and not enough effort made 
to recruit such people. 
The bulk of Board members, htmever, shotid ha;e a .backgromd 
pertinent to the Centre's scientfflc program of research and training. 
These members should be of such standing within their disciplines or 
fields as to camnand the respect of the Centre’s staff. Some of these 
‘sclentlflc members’ should still be fully Involved in research so that 
they’bring to the Board the fire of an active research perspective. 
Others, through the natural process of job maturation that affects most 
successful scientists, till be organizational heavies who have moved from 
suciks in active research to a significant Involvement ln either research 
management and administration or the policy arena. Between them, these 
‘scientific members” should, as far as numbers allow, encompass the spread 
of scientific disciplines or areas of agricultural expertise most 
important to the Centre’s program of research and training. 
3.2. Structure bv Nationality and Reqion 
Superimposed on considerations of structure by fzld of expertise, 
Boards should also be structured to gf ve an appropriate ml% of members by 
natIonal ty and region. Given the large number of nationalities relevant 
to the CGIAR System and to any one Centre, unless specified otherwise by a 
Centre’s By-laws. It would seem a sensible rule normally to have no more 
than one member from any particular country at any one time. Likewise, 
but agaln subject to the By-laws, spread of membership across relevant 
regions of the world (whether of donor or developing countries) should be 
sought before having multiple members from any one region. 
. 
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“Great news, ladies and gentlemen. 
muddled through again.” 
We’ve 
Judgements have to be made about the appropriate degree of balance 
between members from donor countries and regions vis-a-vis members fruu 
developing countries and regions relevant to the Centre’s mandate. 
Appropriate balance probably implIes having at least half the members 
from donor countrfes. This is for three reasons. First, It r.ecognizes 
the role that donors play in financing the CG System. Second, at least In 
an Indirect way, it gives the donors a measure of hands-on assurance as to 
the management of their investment in the System. Third, donor-country 
members, being actual givers, as It were, rather than potential receivers, .m 
are perhaps less likely to be influenced by their 6wn national interests 
In their board decision making. At the same time, developing country 
members (including host-country members) have a legitfmate and significant 
role to play fn brdnging their natIonal and reglonal perspectives before 
theBoard. Without this contribution, the Board can hardly have an 
adequate understanding of agriculture In the cultural, s=io-political and 
institutional environments to which the Centre’s research and training are 
directed. 
3.3. Structure by Experience, Aqe and Sex 
. 
It is also highly desirable that board membership reflect a mix In 
terms of age, experience and knowledge of the CC system, and sex. 
Given the uniqueness, peculiarity. complexity and potential fragility 
of the a System, it is very bportant that each Board con&&n at least 
twu or three members who are extremely well experienced in the System. 
such seasoned (though not pickled) members can often guide the Board 
through their knowledge of how the System works and of its past failures 
and successes. An obvious source of such seasoned members Is the pool of 
people who have completed successful service on the board of another 
Centre and have participated effectively In external reviews or other 
System activities. Another potential source Is the pool of ex-staff 
members (both scientific and admlnistratlve) of the Centres. TOG, 
experience Indicates that a Board may often benefit from having one or 
two members who bre concurrently members of ocher Boards. The main 
1 : . 
advantage of such overlapping membership lies  in the informationTit MY 
give the board about how other Centres are handling particu lar current 
problems. As well, for Centres having cooperative activities or highly  
caupkementary mandates or overlapping regional mandates, a concurrent 
Board member can often fac ilitate awareness of the need for and .the 
Implementation of possibly  desirable liaison, coordination or 
cooperation. A small degree of overlapping membership can also do much to 
enhance the unity  of the System as a whole. 
As well as two or three experienced veterans; each ,Board should also 
contain at leas t one or two novices  to the CC Sys  tern. This  Is  necessary 
to bring in neu,blood to prevent Inbreeding, combat excess ive c lubblnes s  
and maintain v itality  while at the same time ensuring the ongoing 
existence of a pool of younger to middle-aged people ulth Board experience 
who, having proved their merit, can be recyc led for further use. 
In terms of age per se, Boards should be cautious - for obvious  
reasons of effic ienc y  and v itality  - about the appointment of people who 
might be c lassed as elderly  or, In co lloquial terms, “over the hill”. 
Suffice to note that many corporations set 70 as the upper age limit for 
appointment or reappointment to their Board. 
Boards should also ensure that tiey are of mixed sex. This  Is  not 
only  necessary in terms of broad soc ial think ing or of CSIAR wishes but 
also because there is  often a need for both a male and a female 
perspective to be brought to bear in Board deliberations . His torica lly . 
though les s  so in the recent past, Boards have lacked female members. As 
of 1987, It Is  s till true that there are disproportionately few female 
members. Due to soc ial c ircumstances, to date It has been much easier to 
find su itable male members than female members. H-ever, this  is  changing 
and the aim should be to have at leas t more than a token representation of 
females from both developing and donor countries. W ithout such 
representation, the role of women in development - whether as food 
producers and users or as s c ientis ts  - will not receive the attention It 
deserves. w 
“Gentlemen, do we NEED LI 
woman member’?” 
3.4. Structure over Time . . 
The major constraint on Board structure over time is the CGIAR 
groundrule that at-large and CC-nominee (I.e., all except ex officio) 
members may serve no more than two consecutive terms of at most.three 
years each during any one stint of membership on a particular Board. The 
normal pattern of Board tenure has thus become a first term of three years 
follwed, assuming satisfactory performance, by a second term of three 
years (I.e., a 3 + 3 - 6 years' tenure pattern). In practice, for the 
reasons noted later in this Section, membership bbyond six years has and 
may sometimes occur but not as frequently as cases of less than six-year 
tenure. , 
m what follows, the existing tenure rule of 3 + 3 = 6 years is 
accepted. Other possibilities (such as 2 + 2 + 2 = 6, 2 + 4 - 6. 
2 + 4 + 2 - 8 or 4 + 2 + 2 - 8 years together with probation and quota 
canstraints on length of service) have their attractions. They might be 
wrth stronger consideration in the future. However, until Boards train 
themselves not to rcappolnt every first-term member, the current 
groundrule of two three-year terms would stem.to be best - despite Its 
disadvantages in saw contexts as discussed below. 
Achieving m approptlate membership mix fn terazs of dlsciplfne, 
nrtfonallty, regfon, age, experAence and sex at my one point In tfm is 
difffcult enough; to Wntaln M appropriate membership mix contlnuoruly 
over tfnw 1s much amre difficult. It can only properly be done by 
planning well In advance how vacancies are to be filled. This has several 
implications which are discussed below using (except whcre’grerter 
precision is necessary) a broad categorization of members as either “at 
large’, ‘CG nominee” or “ex officio-.. The term ‘ex officio’ Is used to 
denote members who art either specified ex officio In the By-laws or are 
specified in the By-laws as being designated, nominated or appointed by 
xwe outside entity other than the CCIRR. Corresponding to this usage of 
cx officio, the term “at large” Implies a member elected solely by choice 
of the Board re&irdless of whether or, not this choice Is constrained by a 
:’ 
By-law specification as to nationality or region. Note, however.’ that ,, 
when necessary for discusslon’purposes and as apparent from the context, 
membership is sometimes discussed In terms of Its narrower (but often 
overlapping) categorization into host-country, regionally-restricted, ex 
officio, CC-nominee and at-large members. 
3.4.1. Hembership Table 
Plrst, to plan-its nknbership effectAvely the Board must have 
mntinmmf.y dt Its disposal M Up-to-date drO~Oi&i=& table Of its 
aembership.over, say, the previous ten years. This table should show 
each past and present Board member's name, type of membership, seXI 
nationality, region, field, date (i.e., not just year) of Initial 
appointment, date of actual (or potential) reappointment to a second term 
If relevant and date of cuaplctlon of membership, together with any 
special cmcnt such as whether appointed as a novice, membership of other 
Boards. etc. Information on past members is necessary ln order to achieve 
bdhcc over time in the distribution of members across, In particular, 
countrlqs and regions. It is also relevant to some of the other 
dimensions of structure discussed above. Host importantly. however, st=h 
a table gives a direct Indication of 
and whether or not they are eligible 
term. 
3.4.2. Pile of Potential ?Yembcrs 
when existing members’ terms expire 
for reappointment to a second (final) 
Second, pldnnIng for the filling of Board vacancies implies hdtffng 
ready access to d pool of potentI& members. To this end, each Board 
should mhtdin a file of cUrfC%lLm vitae of 30 or so potential 
appointees. This file shquld be kept under constant review and regularly 
updated by means such as suggestions from past and present members. Centre 
staff. external review team members, and other pertinent sources. In 
particular, fn developing the Board's own file, active and full use 
should be bade of the file of potentlal and actual Baud members 
mIntaIned by thi CCIAR Secretariat - indeed, if a name is suggested for 
. 
the Board’s own file and does not appear on th% Secretariat’s file, ,_ 
enquiry should be made as to why it does not appear on the latter. 
Historically, the Secretariat file has not been used by Boards as much as 
it should have. However, with ongoing development of its size, criteria 
for listing, Indexing and accessibility in terms of specified. . 
characteristics (such as nationality, field. experience. sex, etc.), the 
CGIAR Secretariat’s file should become the pre-eminent source of names for 
a Board’s more detailed consideration In terms of each Individual’s 
qualifications, experience, reputation for integrity,, linguistic ability, 
leadership potential and overall capacity to contribute. positively to the 
effectiveness of the Board. CrLLClaZ to this detailed ConslderdtAon Is 
&he dVdflabflfty of an ddequdte Cutrf~lXZH Vitae. The absence of d 
currkulua vitae atust raise the question of how much can be Izmun about 
the candidate during the selection process. 
3.4.3. Balanced Rotation 
Third. adequate planning of Board structure over time fmplles 
ensuring a balanced rotation of membership. Given that at-large and 
CXXAR-nominee members arc sufficiently effective to warrant their 
appointment to a second three-year term and are able to serve for the 
maximum of six years, the expectation would be for one sixth of the non-cx 
officio members to be replaced each year. Forward planning should be such 
as to achieve this as closely as possible with neither too few nor too 
many vacancies occurring dt the same time. Otherwise, at so(pe stage In 
Its membership cycle, the Board will suffer from a degree of discontinuity 
and lack of experience dnd knouledgc compared to that prevailing with a 
more even rotation of membership. 
Assessment of the nremhership cycle and likely balance of replacement 
over time Is best made with the help of a table showing the pattern of 
e-red replacements of at-large and CCfAR-nominee embers for the next 
six years, i.e., for at least one full cycle. With a line for each I 
at-large and CC-nominee position, and a column for each of the next six 
years, the expecrfdd year of replacement or ellglblllty for reappointment 
can be marked for each position. The number of expected replkiuents and . 
possible reappointments in each year can then be totalled’to shcrw their 
pattern over the next full cycle. Similarly to the table of past and 
current membership discussed In Section 3.4.1, the table of expected 
replacements and reappointments should also be continuously updated. 
should the ascertained pattern of expected replacements not be 
adequately balanced - e.g.* for a Board with 12 non-ex officio pOsitiOnS, 
a 2-2-z-2-2-2 pattern of replacements over six years would be ideal. - 
3-l-O-S-O-3 would be awful - steps must be t&n to achfeve.bettet 
balance. gust what can be done will depend upon the degrees of freedan 
allad by the By-laws of the Centre and possibly the goodwill of the 
CGIAR. possible alternatives to be considered would be asking some 
I#mbtrs to resign before their term was up, not reappointing sune eligible 
aembers for a second term, reappointing scxae eligible members for less 
than a full second term, fllllng vacancies due to death or resignation 
only for the remainder of the previous Incumbent’s term, appointing some 
no-1 replacements for less than a full term, delaying the filling of 
saw vacancies, and extending the term of some members. If one or more of 
these mechanFsms is not followed as a matter of routine, it i.s inevitable 
that over time the cumulative effect of resignations, deaths and 
non-reappointment of Ineffective members vi11 be such as to cause an 
-lance in the pattern of membership rotation. 
3.4.1. Future Leadership 
A fourth and particularly important Implication of effective planning 
of Board structure over time is that aitentlon be paid to ensuring future 
leadership. The fllllnq of vacancies should be planned so that the Board 
~111 always have amongst its members a sufficient number who ate 
recoqnized d ptfotf by virtue of their successful performance In analogous 
roles as having the attributes fincludlng time) needed to chair the Board 
Itself and/or Its committees. Again, in this regard. the CGIAR 
Secretariat’s file of potential nominees as well as the informed advice of 
the Secretar%t can be Invaluable. 
: - , 
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3.4.5. ?kmber Suitability 
Fifth, planning for Board vacancfes fmplles adequate Ume for search 
and selecrdon. . Too often in the past, vacancies have been filled by 
last-minute decisions wIthour due considerarlon of all &he dimensAons 
involved. Far better - should a Board .flnd itself tempted to make such a 
hasky decision - to delay filling the vacancy until a considered choice 
can be made. 
Considered choice of members Implies ‘not orily ensuring that the 
Board’s structural needs in terms of expertise, nationality, age, sex, CG 
experience and leadership potential are met. It also implies that tie 
follcuinq general crlterla should be considered in the selectlon of 
members : 
(al dedicacfon to the overall obfectlves of the Centre and a sense of 
coPnitred service to an?etinq these objectives. 
(bJ a personal employment s:matlon which makes it possible to meet &he 
ti.ae demands of membershIp and Implies no conflict of intereit. 
(cl personal attrIbutes I1nclud.inq language capbill ty.J which ensure tie 
capacity to contribute effectdvely and not be a passenger. 
(dJ capacfty to facilitate and effectively represent the interests of tie 
Centre. as need be, in donor and/or client countries. 
3.4.6. Handling Vacancies 
Non-ex officio Board vacancies are of four types: (1) potential 
vacancies related to the ellgiblllty for reappointment of existing 
first-term members. whether members at large or CC nominees; (2) vacancies 
related to the retirement of at-large members who have completed their 
second term: (3) vacancies due to the retirement of CG nominees who have 
canpleted two %enns; and (4) ad hoc vacancies arising from contingencies 
.- I , . 
such as, e.g., death or, less sadly, appointment to TAC. Adequate _. 
planning for the first three categories should generally cnsuxe that the 
fourth category, i.e., ad hoc vacancies, can be handled expeditiously and 
effectively. What is needed is to have on hand a sufficient file of . 
acceptable potential members covering the major dtiensions of.choice with, 
as need be, complementary use being made of information available from the 
CG Secretariat. The difficulty Is in having adequate planning In train 
for the first three categories. 
3.4.6.1. Reappointment of first-term members ‘- 
wpfnent of a member elAglble for a second term must he seen a~ 
a dec~slon no less Oqxetdn t than the dppointnznt of d new Board member. 
It always iaplles glvfng up the opportunl ty of havdng d new member. The 
difficulty is that a decision on reappointment is generally a decision 
about saneone who, over his or her first three-year term, has become a 
colleague and convivial coaapanlon If not a bosom pal. In consequence, 
no&reelection Is usually a difficult thing for’ a Board to bring Itself to 
do, particularly If the member has been a diligent attender. If 
non-rcappoinbaent (or a shortened second term) Is predicated for reasons 
other than effectiveness (such as the need to better balance the pattern 
of replacements over time), these needs can be explained to the member 
involved without significant embarrassment. 
The more difficult situation Is when a member’s lack of effectiveness 
dictates that he or she should not be reappointed. Such Ineffectiveness 
may arise through non-attendance at Board meetings or, when In attendance, 
by lack of contribution due to language difficulties, acedia, poor 
preparation or sheer Incompetence and, In extreme cases, by negative 
contribution through dlsnrptlveness. erethism. excessive loquaciousness or 
the Inability to view matters fran a Board perspective. To mitigate the 
inevitable embarrassment involved In non-reappointment of such members, at 
least two things are necessary. First, the possibility of and the reasons 
for non-reappointment should be made per‘fectly clear to prospective 
. 
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m e m b e r s  b e fo re  the i r  ini t ial  a p p o i n tm e n t. In  part icular ,  th e  exHctat im 
o f fu l l  a tte n d a n c e  a t m e e tin g s  a n d  a d e q u a te  p r e p a r a tio n .fo r  th e m  shou ld  b e  
st ressed.  S e c o n d , fo rma l  m e c h a n i s m s  shou ld  b e  in  p lace  to  e n s u r e  th a t th e  
p rocess  o f m o n i to r ing  m e m b e r s ’ pe r fo rmance  a n d  th e  dec is ion  a b o u t 
r e a p p o i n tm e n t a re  as  a n o n y m o u s  a n d  impe rsona l  as  poss ib le .  A S  d iscussed  
in  S e c tio n  3 .4 .7  b e l o w , th is  is o n e  o f m a n y  reasons  d ic tat ing th a t th e  
B o a r d  shou ld  h a v e  a  N o m i n a tio n s  C o m m i tte e  a n d  th a t it b e  c o m p o s e d  o f 
expe r i enced  m e m b e r s . 
A  par t icu lar  diff iculty Is th a t dec is ions  o n < o n - r e a p p o i n Q u e n t 
inef fect iveness h a v e  to  b e  m a d e  o n  th e  ev idence  o f on ly  two to  
two-and-a-ha l f  years’ m e m b e r s h i p . T h e  te m p ta tio n  to  p r o c e e d  to  
d u e  to  
r e a p p o i n tm e n t 1s  b o u n d  to  b e  st rong,  par t icu lar ly  as  it is O fte n  sa id  ( a n d  
is i n d e e d  to  s o m e  extent  t rue)  th a t it takes  a  n e w  m e m b e r  a t least o n e  or  
two B o a r d  m e e tin g s  to  fin d  h is  o r  he r  fe e t: l ikewise, If th e  m e m b e r  h a s  
m issed  o n e  o r  two m e e tin g s  seeming ly  th r o u g h  n o  faul t  o f his  o r  he r  o w n . 
T h e  te m p r a  tio n  ro  r e a p p o i n t , h o w e v e r , shou ld  b e  a v o i d e d  ff th e r e  is a n y  
rea l  d o u b t o f a  E m b e r ’s e ffect ive part ic ipat ion.  T h e  responslb i l l t ies  o f 
B o a r d s  a re  to o  ser ious  fo r  h a r d h e a d e d n e s s  n o t to  prevai l .  Norma l l y  It 
shou ld  b e  poss ib le  to  assess  s o m e  six to  twe lve m o n ths  b e fo re  exp l ry  o f a  
m e m b e r ’s first te r m  w h e the r  r e a p p o i n tm e n t Is wor th  m a k i n g . If th e  
a s s e s s m e n t Is n o t to  r e a p p o i n t, th e n  th e  process o f p r o c e e d i n g .to  th e  
a p p o i n tm e n t o f a  n e w  m e m b e r , w h e the r  a t - large o r  C C - n o m i n e e , shou ld  b e  
ta k e n  u p . Th is  is necessa ry  o n  a t least  a  c o n tin g e n c y  bas is  s ince  th e  
fo rma l  dec is ion  o n  n o n - r e a p p o i n tm e n t wi l l  genera l l y  occur  on ly  a t th e  
B o a r d  m e e tin g  p reced ing  exp l ry  o f th e  m e m b e r ’s first .te r m . T o o . g i ven  
a d e q u a te  n o t ice o f th e  l i ke l ihood o f n o n - r e a p p o i n tm e n t, a  m e m b e r  m a y  o p t 
to  Ind ica te  th a t h e  o r  s h e  Is n o t ava i lab le  fo r  r e a p p o i n tm e n t. 
3 .4 .6 .2 . A p p o i n tm e n t o f a t - l a rge -members  
T h e  m o r e  n o r m a l  type o f r e p l a c e m e n t Is th a t fo r  a t - large m e m b e r s  w h o  
h a v e  c o m p l e te d  two te rms.  S u c h  r e p l a c e m e n ts, e x c e p t fo r  u n to w a r d  o r  
a typical  c i rcumstances,  a re  no rma l l y  p red ic tab le  th r e e  years  In  a d v a n c e . 
*r 
ZYJ give adequare rfme for seatch and selectAon, the replacement process,. 
should begfn at Zeasr two years ahead of when.the new at-large member 
would begln membershIp. Should difficulty occur In finding suitable 
candidates, or outside advice seem pertinent to assist in deciding on 
Board needs, assistance should be sought from the CGIAR Secretariat. Such 
assistance might be direct or via an acceptable third party found through 
the good offices of the Secretariat. Suffice to note that one 
characteristic of an effective Board is the ability to recognize when it 
needs help. . .- 
Id&&, the shortlfsting, dcqufescence, election and acceptance of 
the Ned WJXIZXX should be completed by or at &he time of the pentitimate 
(I.*. , second) Board lDeetAng before he or she commences duty. Thus, 
depending on the frequency of Board meetings, a proposed new at-large 
member weld be a member-designate for some six months or so before taking 
up formal duty. This would often give the opportunity, If thought worth 
the cost (as might be the case with a novice to the Cc System), of having 
th&‘membtr-designate attend a Board meeting as an observer before he or 
she formally joins the Board. 
. 
3.4.6.3. Appointment of CC-nominee members 
In their role as Board members, Cc nominees are ln no way different 
frar at-large members. Their allegiance to the CGIAR 1s no more and no 
less than that of any other Board member. CG nominees differ only In tha; 
their process of Initial appointment Involves nomination and’approval by 
the members of the CCIAR on the basis of Board advice ori needed 
attributes, and In their process of reappointment to a second term which 
also Involves CGIAR members’ approval. . . Under current procedures, just as 
for at-large members, at least two years’ lead time is essential for 
proper selection and confirmarlon of CC-nominee members. 
Assuming Boards function effectively, there seems to be no reason 
why the approval of CCIAR members should be necessary for the 
reappointment or*non-reappointment of CC nominees to d second term. The 
‘-. 1) 
Board Itself can xX8 properly make this judgement. Such procedure would 
” also avoid the potential embarrassment of a Board sometimes having to 
confront CGIAR members with the Information that it recommends 
non-reappointment (perhaps of a favoured son or daughter) and, worse 
.still, of CGIAR members not accepting such a recommendation. : . 
To date, the use of the Cc-nominee process appears to have made 
little difference in terms of individuals appointed. Boards, when they 
wished, would seem to have been able to arrange CGIAR nomination and - 
approval of the people they wanted. Though hardly“meeting the spirit of 
having CG mminees, this has not necessarily always been a bad thing. 
Conversely, It would probably not be a bad thing and would 1dikelY be 
advan&ageow if CC no&nees were more, actf vely and forcefully selected by 
the CCIAR. @or this to happen, some change in procedure would be 
needed. For example, in conjunction with CGIAR members and as a subset of 
Its file of potential Board members, the CG Secretariat might develop and 
maintain a blue-chip list of 30 or so wllllng individuals regarded as 
tried and true from among utmm the Boards (assuming no special 
circumstances) must choose their CG noralncts. These might then constitute 
much of the veteran element on Boards. As Boards made their ongoing 
choices of CG nominees (totalllng some ten or so per year) from this 
approved list, names would be deleted and new ones added. As well as 
ensuring its more active Involvement. such a procedure would better 
accummdate the desire of the CGIAR to have some say in Board membership 
so that It is not Molly self-determined, while also better ensuring the 
quality of cc; nominees. At the same time, Boards would.maintaln a degree 
of choice. though somewhat constrained, as to their CC-nominee members. 
Too, the replacement process for CG nominees would be speeded up - albeit 
by transferring Its search element to the CGIAR Secretariat. 
3.4.7. Nominations Ccnunlttee 
Plnally but far from least, a sixth Implication of adequate plannlns 
for Board membership is that the Board should have d Nominations 
Colmlf t fee. The naed for such a standing committee Is evident from the 
: . , 
foregoing discussion of all the considerations pertinent to enS&ing an 
appropriate Board structure across its members. Experience shows that .. 
such work Is best done by a small rather than a large group. Too, just as 
importantly as considerations of work effectiveness, use of a smallish 
subcommittee Is necessary because of the sensitive and confidential nature 
of many of the matters that have to be considered - in particular, the 
seeking of curriculum vitae (perhaps often best done via informal 
channels), discussions as to the suitability of potential new members and 
- as ratsed in Section 3.4.6.1 above - the possible reappointment of 
first-term amubers. Likewise, because of the se&itlve and confidential 
nature of much of Its business, the secretary of the Nominations Coicanittee 
right best be the Secretary of the Board. 
3.4.7.1. Terms of reference 
me mjor terms of reference of the Nomfna tf ens Commit tee should 
generally be for it to develop and &ring to the Board reconmendations on: 
la) the nomination of new at-large members; fbl &he reappointment of 
first-term at-large and CGnomfnee members; (cl the desfrable attributes 
of neuCC-nominee members; fd) the nomination-of Board Chairperson and 
ViWafrperson; and, possibly, (el the notination of chairpersons and/or 
mwbets for tie other standfng comittees of the Board. Both the latter, 
If a responslblllty of the Nominations Committee, should be done ln 
consultation with the Board’s Chalrperson. However, depending on 
tradition and desire, the prime responslblllty for nominating or naming 
standlng coamittec chairpersons and membership might well be left to the 
Board’s Chairperson in consultation, If he or she wishes, with the 
chairperson of the Nominations Committee and other Board members. 
uithin its terms of reference and assisted by the Secretary to the 
Board. the Nominations Committee would also be responsible for all the 
backup work necessary to ensure effective Board structure over time. 
Among this work would be regular review and updating of the chronological 
i 
table of Board membership, of the table showing expected vacancies over 
the:next membership cycle and. most Importantly, of the file of curriculti 
vitae of potential new members. 
3.4.7.2. Membership 
Because its work is so obviously crucial to the Board’s 
effectiveness, the Nominatfons co&tree should be composed of respected 
and well-experienced- senior members of the Board. Such composition will 
also help ensure that its recommendations ark received seriously. 
wan&q of the membership of the NomlnatAons Conauittee should rest 
with the Board chairperson. In practical tenas, because of the 
constraints on the Committee’s membership outlined in the next paragraph, 
such naming probably has to be done annually. However, due to the nature 
of the Camalttee’s work, so far as possible there should be a degree of 
continuity In Its membership. 
Supplemented by the usual power to coopt If necessary, three Is 
probably the right number of umabers for &be &@mAnat;lons Committee. These 
members should not include any ex offfcfo members of the Board - 
certainly not the Director General who In the context of the Nominations 
Committee should be seen as a servant of the Board, and - CG nominees 
excepted - preferably not other members whose nomination or appointment 
rests outside the Board because they are not elected members and do not 
necessarily have an ongoing personal involvement with the Board. Nor 
should the Nominations Committee include any at-large or CC-nominee 
embers who. ulrh&a &he term of office of the current Connatt&ee, are to be 
considered for reappofntmmt to a second term. Nor, given the workloads 
involved. should the Chairperson of the Nominations Committee be the Board 
Chairperson or chafr.another Board standing committee. Members of the 
Nominations Committee may, however, fruitfully belong to some other Board 
subcuumittee (typically the Program or Audit Committee). Such involvement 
enables them to have a better assessment of the Board’s functioning and 
membership need% 
3.4.7.3. wcamnendations to Board 
In recommending new at-large members to the Board, the Nominations 
Camnittee might preferably nominate two names for each vacancy SO a~ t0 
ensure a degree of overall Board participation in choice. In choosing 
these names, the Coaxmittee - through its chairperson - should check with 
the Director General as to how he or she sees the needs of the Board and 
also about possible lncompatibilitles so that old personality clashes do 
not resurface at the Board. - .a 
For &he nomination of Board Chafrperson and - if wlth~n Its nundate 
- subcodttee chdlrpersons, the Nomlnatlons Committee must not only draw 
on fts own wisdom but also ensure that each Board member's opinion is 
canvassed In prtvate dlscussion. In particular , care must be taken to 
avoid any obvious clashes of personality between the proposed Chairperson, 
subcarmittee chairpersons and the Director General. 
The frequency of Nominations Comnittee recommendations to the Board 
should be at least annual and, as necessary; when ad hoc vacancies 
occur. One meeting of the Committee per year.- held lmmedlately before 
the Board’s annual meeting - should be sufficient: between annual 
meetings, business can be conducted by correspondence at the l.nltlatlve of 
the Comnittee’s chairperson. 
whether a responsibllfty of the Board Chairperson or of the 
Nodnarions Committee, nomination of.srandlng conrmittee membershfps and 
chalrpersons (excluding sme Executive Committee positions which may be 
specified under the By-laws) should be on an amu& basds so as to ensure 
desfrable rotation. The term of the Board Chairperson. however. Is a 
matter of broader Import and significance with a variety of nuances. 
3.4.8. Chairperson’s Term 
The Chaf rperson's competence is crucial to the effectAveness of the 
Board. Ipso fatto. having found a good Chairperson, the Board would wish 
to stick with him or her as long as possible. Likewise, if a Udzperso?, 
proves inadequate to the task, an effective Board would wish him or her to 
be speedily replaced. At the same time, for reasons of getting to know 
the job and wanting to have an impact, potential Chairpersons may not be 
interested if their term is to be for only one year. The obvious 
canpraaise is that the Board should appoint d new Chafrperson for one 
year in the first instance on the understanding that if the assessment of 
performance is favourable, the term would be extended on a one- or 
two-year basis depending on the person's remaining tenure. 
unless there were special circumstances. it Is most likely that a 
&rd member would not be appointed to the position of Chairperson during 
his or her first term on the Board. Given this, and recognizing the need 
for a good Chairperson to hold the reins as long as possible, the ideal 
the for a neu ChaIrperson to be inltlally elected is when he or she fs 
just startlng a second term. This would give the possibility of three 
years in the job - long enough to cane to grips with the position and have 
an’liupact, yet short enough to enable reasonable rotation of the chair. 
Compared to a shorter time, three years is also to be preferred for a good 
Chairperson because it can help to mitigate the disadvantage a Chairperson 
(and indeed the Board as a whole) Inevitably suffers - despite the best of 
will - by not being in office as long as the Director General. A minimum 
of three years would also be advantageous relative to the operation of the 
Coasnlttee of Board Chairpersons. To date, due to rapid rotation of the 
Board Chairs. this camnittee has suffered from a lack of sufficient 
continuity In Its membership. 
C?md planning would also dictate that the choice of incomfng 
Chairperson be decided a year ahead of his or her taking office so as to . 
allow d measure of induction to the role. With the Board working well. 
this selection as Chairperson-designate might best occur at the start oE 
his or her third year on the Board. 
3.4-g. tack 0E a Potential Chalmerson 
‘though It should not happen with an effective Nominations Committee. 
a Board may perforce find itself with no suitable member for the role of 
Chairperson. Notwithstanding that it has doubtless happened in the past, 
compranlse on a doubtful possibility should never be the answer.‘ It 1s 
sA&ly a fact that d good Board member is not iecessarlly a good 
Chafrperson , and likewise d fact that the role of Chairperson is too 
fnrportant to be filled with a gamble. Two possibilities suggest 
the-elves. All, It Is hoped, entail sufficient ~kxcmflture for the 
Board and its Wocoinations Committee to ensure adequate plannlng.for Board 
leadership! , 
First, ff the outgoing Chairperson fs suitable, his or her term 
might & extended for a year or two as a deliberate exception to the rule 
of a maxImum of six years’ continuous Board tenure. This would give 
breathing space for an existing or new member to be groomed for the 
pos1t1otL Such an approach, however, would need certain safeguards to 
protect the Board and the System from longevity developing Into either 
senility or autocracy. Perhaps a suitable safeguard would be the need for 
approval by the ChaIrman of the Group on a case-by-case basis. 
Second, lacking a s&table potential Chairperson, a Board might 
decide - rather than COmprOmiSlng on a candidate - to bring in an 
appropriate person aa a new member to fill &he chair. This would have to 
be soawne of stature experienced In the System who had successfully 
served in an analogous role and was still up to the job. Sme such 
persons would likely be found on the blue-chip list of people available as 
CG nominees that, as suggested In Section 3.4.6.3 above, might be 
maintained by the CCXAR Secretariat. 
ImplIcit in the above paragraphs Is the fact that. to date, some 
Boards have pafd too little attentfon to ensuring that they ate 
effectively chafred. Some Boards or Nominations Committees have not met 
Y 
their planning responslbillty as well as they should have. From reports 
of corridor discussion at InternatiOnal CentreS’ Week 1986, it is apparent 
that scme members of the CCIAR are beginning to wonder if the process for 
choosing a Chairperson is adequate - particularly in comparison, for 
example, to the process of appointing a Director General (which itself 
would likely’be improved by having one or two wise men from outside, well 
versed in the CGIAR and clearly disinterested parties, on the search 
camnlttee). The clear message, bluntly stated. Is that Boards must pay 
better attention to -the appointment of their chairs. _- One way of ensuring 
this would be for Boards to introduce some form of-additional .’ 
control/approval into the chair selection/appointment process. For 
example, the No&nations Committee might be required to explain and 
jhstlfy Its recamnendation to the Board; or consultation might be required 
with the Chairman of the-Group (via the CGIAR Secretariat) before formal 
appointment is made: or it might be mandatory for a blue chipper (a la 
Section 3.4.6.3) to attend (at Centre expense!) when the Nominations 
CCXRnittee is SeleCtfng a new Chairperson: or some cM&ination of such 
measures. If some such steps are not taken, present autonomy of ,choice is 
bound to be eroded by the introduction of some more drastic form of 
external involvement or control. In particular, pressure for such a 
change $11 be generated if External nanagement Reviews find it necessary 
to report adversely on Board performance. Let’s hope not. 
3.5. External Constraints on Membership 
All the matters so far discussed In relation to Board membership ‘and 
Its structure over time are’dlfficult enough for the Board as a whole and 
the Nominations Committee in particular. There are, hwever, two other 
tricky matters of an external nature that may constrain a Board’s ability 
to ensure an appropriate membership structure. One of these Is the wish 
of scme donors to control which of their nationals may be appointed to 
particular Boards. The other Is the constraint on membership structure 
tmposed by a Centre’s By-laws. 
3.5-l. Donor Pressure 
Those donor agencies which attempt to heavily influence and, In some 
cases, control nomination of their nationals to Boards doubtless do so on 
the basis of what they perceive as sound reasoning. The selected natiohal 
is chosen as’the country’s top expert in.a specialized field important to 
the’centre to which it is planned he or she be appointed. Furthermore, 
having the blessing of the donor agency, the particular national Is seen 
as providing a two+py benefit between the donor and the centre. Such a .- 
dew perspective, however, may be quite oui of line wtth a Board’s 
n&b. me Board may already have sufficient expertise of the type 
proposed: Its needs may be quite different. Or it may be that another 
national, not sponsored by the donor, may be far more attractive to the 
Board for reasons of leadership or experience quite unrelated to the 
person’s professional area. The problem Is further compounded by sane 
donors who presume and act as If they have perpetual rights to a Board 
seat. Difficult though It be, a Board must resist such pressures, not 
least by being able to show through the work of Its Nominations Caittee 
that a well-argued plan of equitable and apposite membership rotation ls 
being followed over time. . 
The bottom line in meting donor pressure must be that the Board 
should never elect d member mere1 y on grounds of ndtlonall ty WI thout 
regard to qualiflcdtAons and approprf ateness in terms of Board needs. 
This same rule should apply - to face another fact of life - when a Board. 
uses prospective membership as part of the process of courting donors. 
of course, as long as donor pressure or control Is not Involved, 
there ls nothing wrong and It may be very advantageous for a Board to have 
at least one member who has a strong donor affiliation. As well as other 
attributes. such a member can bring a donor perspective to Board 
deliberations. 
^ 
“he wprrvised. I’vr? mom cd. I’ve directed. I’ve frcrided. 
I’ve chaired. k fraL else ir hre?” c: 
3.5.2. Centre W-laws _. 
The By-laws of each Centre specify the composition of Its Board in 
terms of the number of - to use the simplest categorization - at-large, 
CO-ncxbee and ex officio members, or - to use a more complete .but not 
necessarily mutually exclusive categorization - host-country,, regionally 
restricted, at-large, a-nominee and ex officio members. In their Board 
specifications the By-laws differ quite a bit across the Centres. To give 
. but one example, the specification of total Board_ size currently varies * _- 
from 10 to 18 members. 
In ternrj of Board structure, the problem of the By-laws is that at 
best (through sf ze and other restrictive speclficatlons) they AnevI tab1 y 
constraIn &he Board in Its freedom of naembershlp choice while at worst 
(through ex officio or other analogous- speclficatfons) they may land the 
Board with ineffectIve members who constrain.Ats performance. This is 
not to say that the initial reasoning behind By-law specifications was . 
wiong - though some lessons might be drawn from experience to date. 
One particular problem arises because, in contrast to developing 
country members, the employers of developed country members often make 
allowance for Board activities. In consequence, the burden of work tends 
to fall on such developed country members. 
As well as the constraint they impose on the Board’s freedom of 
choice, a difficulty that may occur with members who are appointed on a 
regionally-restricted or national basis Is that, particularly under the 
catalytic Influence of like members from other countries in the region, 
they may pursue thefr national Interests at the expense of Board 
Interests. Stated another way, not all regional nationals may be as 
dispassionate as would be hoped in matters affecting the disposition of 
Centre resources. The same problem may also occur with host-country 
nominees who may, at worst, tend to see the Centre as a substitute for 
rather than complementary to national research. However, all Centres 
probably have tadefer at least to some extent to the wishes of their host 
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g o v e r n m e n t. T o  n o t d o  so  cou ld  l e a d  to  s t ra ined o r  e v e n  h o s ti le re la t ions 
wh ich  a  C c n tre cou ld  Ill a fford.  A n o the r  p r o b l e m  th a t m a y  occur  wi th 
h o s t-country (par t icular ly  ex  o fficio) n o m i n e e s  is th a t, d u e  to  f requency  
o f tu rnover ,  th e y  m a y  neve r  b e  o n  th e  B o a r d  fo r  l o n g  e n o u g h  to  c o n tr ibute 
s igni f icant ly to  th e  B o a r d ’s dec is ion  m a k i n g . This,  h o w e v e r , Is ‘a  p r o b l e m  
W ith wh ich  a  B o a r d  p robab ly  just h a s  to  l ive. 
Va r i ous  a p p r o a c h e s  m ight  b e  cons ide red  in  a tte m p tin g  to  o v e r c o m e  th e  
const ra int  Im p o s e d  by  its By - laws  o n  a  B o a r d ’s m e m b e r s h i p . O n e  a p p r o a c h , .- 
o f course,  w o u l d  b e  to  al ter  th e  re levant  By- laws.  V h e the r  o r  n o t .to  
a tte m p t th ls , .howevcr ,  w o u l d  n e e d  pr ior  a s s e s s m e n t. For  s o m e  C e n tres, It 
w o u l d  n o t b e  a  s tep to  b e  ta k e n  l ight ly s ince,  as  wel l  as  lega l  
impl icat ions,  It m a y  h a v e  pol i t ical  repercuss ions  - fo r  e x a m p l e , th e  h o s t 
G o v e r n m e n t laay  ‘ta k e  the o p p o r tuni ty  to  rev iew a n d  c h a n g e  th e  By - laws  In  
the i r  e n tirety, P a r  b e ttcr’lf the p r o b l e m  c a n  b e  ame l io ra ted  If n o t 
so lved  by  e d u c a tin g  m e m b e r s  to  the i r  ro le  a n d  responsib i l i ty  as  B o a r d  
m e m b e r s . n o t least  In  c o n trast to  b e i n g  undes i r ed  ‘n a tio n a l  
representa t ives’. T o o , shou ld  th e  By - law  const ra int  l e a d  to  a  B o a r d  a t 
s o m e  t lmc  lack ing  des i red  exper t ise,  u s e  m ight  b e  m a d e  o f obse rve r  o r  
consu l tant  status to  p rov ide  th e  des i red  In p u t to  re levant  B o a r d  
s u b c o a m l tte e s  o r  to  th e  B o a r d  Itself. L ikewise,  th e  m e c h a n i s m , o f obse rve r  
status m ight  b e  u s e d , If necessary ,  to  a c c o m o d a te  th e  n e e d  fo r  a  p resence  
a t th e  B o a r d  o f a  n a a l n c e  f rom a  h o s t c o u n try o the r  th a n  th e  c o u n try 
spec i f ied  in  th e  By- laws.  
4. FUNCTIONING O F  T H E  B O A R D  
Hav ing  a n  approp r ia te  m ix o f c o m p e te n t m e m b e r s  w h o  a c c e p t the i r  
responsib l l1 t lcs  is a  necessa ry  b u t n o t suff ic ient cond i t ion  fo r  hav ing  a n  
el fect lve -rd. T o  b e  e ffective, a  B o a r d  m u s t b o th  orgmlze  a n d  b e h a v e  
;tself so  as  to  e n s u r e  th a t It fu n c tio n s  successful ly .  h rpo r tanC e l emen rs  
In  th is  fu n c tio n i n g  are:  
(71 
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the use of approprAate subconnnfttees to share t!! Board's &&load;. 
the appafnmenr of competent people to the offIces of the Board; 
the maJntenance of good working relations with the Director General; 
the tintenance of good external relations; 
the effective inductlon of new members; . 
the effective conduct of Board meetings in appropriate locations at 
no nvre nor less than sufficient frequency; 
the fruitful partlcIpation of observers at Board meetings.. 
the adequate -availabilf Cy of pertinent Information to the Board; and m 
the avaflabilfty to the Board of sufficfeni-staff and fInhncfa1 
resources. 
4.1. Subcommittees of the Board 
To make sure sufficient attention is given to the various elements of 
Its responsibility and to share the workload, a Centre Board should have 
at least four standing committees. These are d Nominations Cosm.f&tee, a 
Program ConmU t tee, M Audi t Cod t tee and an Executl ve CoElli t tee. To 
ensure sufficient review of their performance and adequate rotation of 
membership, each of these standtng comnlttees should be elected 
annually-. 
Because of particular need, some Boards may have one or two standing 
camnlttees ln addition to the above four essential ones. Thus, with a 
large Board of 15 or more members, there might be justification to have 
two program-oriented standing ccxmnlttees; for exampli, one with a focus to 
research and one with a focus to outreach and training. Care should be 
taken, however, not to have too many standing committees relative to the 
site of the Board and the need for their adequate servicing. Conversely , 
Boards should resist the temptation to have too few standing committees. 
One extreme would be to have all business done by the Board as a whole. 
This would give no gains from specialization and division of work. 
Another extreme would be to have a single subcommittee handling executive, 
finance, audit and nomination responsibilities. This would risk the 
% 
concentration of power In the hands of a select few. worse still, both 
such extremes may lead to conflict of interest or other ImpedFments to 
good decision making in the areas of nomination and audit. 
The Board’s Chairperson should be an ex officio nmnber of all its 
subcommtttees and, to enable their proper participation ln the 
bread-and-butter business of the Board, eacrh other Board member should at 
bdst belong to sollp standing comni &tee other than the Nomina tlons or the 
Executfve comlrtee, _a .- 
In order to handle particular needs arising from time to time which 
require speclflc.expertise or attention, the Boardmy also mike use of 
ad hoc subcoad t tees. These vi11 usually be appointed by the Board for a 
specific one-off task and will generally not Involve the Ncxninatlons 
cammittee. 
All subcoaunittees of the 8oerd should have formal written terms of 
rcierence approved and periodically reviewed by the Board. These 
statements should be included in the Board’s Handbook as discussed in 
Section 4.8.1 bclw. . 
In their functioning, all Board subccnmalttees should have the power . 
to coopt as need be. Too. as should also apply to the Board as a whole, 
subcamlttees should (with due regard to the costs involved and subject to 
the approval of the Board1 make use of the services of honorary members, 
advisers or consultants. Fran time to time such people may be needed to 
ensure adequate expertise or liaison with relevant outsade bodies. Thus 
the Nominations Cocmnittee might seek advice on Board membership needs, the 
Program Committee on particular research or training matters, and the 
Audit Committee on particular accounting or legal matters. The same 
applies to ad hoc subcmrnlttees - for example. the Search Connalttee for a 
new Director General might well contain one or two experienced outsiders 
of high repute. As also applies In the case of the Board as a whole, the 
use of honorary members, advisers or consulcanclr by subcorm trees should 
be made, to the Geatest extent possible, In consul tatlon WI th the 
’ . 
DfttcCor cenerdl . Neither the Board nor Its subcommittees should run 
wild and barge in, as It were, from  above. This applies particularly to 
the use of consultants and the commissioning of reviews. Such services 
would generally best be arranged as a Management-executed Input to the 
Board rather than by the Board itself. 
. Again, just ds for meetIngs of the Board as a whole, as far as 
possible members of subcomn.ittees should not parciclpate In - indeed, 
should absent thenuel.ves from  - the discussion of matters In which thelr .- 
partfcipatlon would or could involve a conflk between thefr oun'personal 
interest and that of the Board. Sometimes, of course, this Is not 
possible - notably, for example, In the determ ination of Board honoraria. 
In such cases the Board must practlse self-regulation by ensuring the 
reasonableness of Its decisions. 
4.1.1. Nualnatlons CamPlttee 
Because of Its direct relevance to Board membership and structure, 
the Nominations Camaittee has already been discussed ln Section 3.4.7. 
Suffice to repeat here that Its role 1s crucial to the effectiveness of 
the Board. Accordingly, the Nom lnatlons Coam .lttee m ust be coqosed of 
experienced and respected senior members of the Board who have d capacity 
for hardheadedness. 
4.1.2. P rwram  Canralt tee 
Because of the magnitude of Its task, the Program  Colmaittee ~111 
usually be the largest subcommittee of the Board. Its role Is to advise 
the Board on all aspects of the Centre’s research and training programs 
Insofar as those aspects are relevant to the formulation of policies and 
?lans and the monitoring of performance and impact. 
. 
As noted In Section 4.1 above, If a Board Is large enough, It m ight 
advantageously have two program -oriented standing committees: one for 
research. the othm  for technology transfer via training and outreach: or. 
’ alternatively, one mainly concerned with Internal/domestic affairs of a 
program nature, the other with external matters such as policies oriented 
to the promotion and monitoring (but not the management) of interaction 
between the Centre and its national-program partners. If there uere two 
program-oriented subcoumittees, It is to be expected they uould somttimes 
need to hold joint meetings. 
In what follows, only a single progrmriented standing committee is 
assumed. With two such camlttees, the discussion would need appropriate : .- 
adjustment . 
4.1.2.1. Terms of reference 
The major tern of ref etence of the Program C0zmt.i t tee wf 11 typIcal y 
encoapass: mandate suitabflfty; the relevance, quality and 
appropriateness of all the Centre's research and training act~vltles; 
scIentffic linkages with other relevant instftutlons including those of 
the~CGI&Z; relations with elIen& countries; and impact of the Centre's 
wvrk . Agendas for meetings of the Comnlttee should be set by Its 
chairperson In consultatidn with the Board Chairperson, the Director 
General%and, as need be. members of the Coamittee. 
A good example of Program Committee terms of reference is given by 
those for CIAT (1986, pp.90-92) reproduced ln Appendix 1. As exempllf led 
there, the Prograa Conmlttee should also have uell-defined operatIonal 
procedures relating to how it gains its knowledge (which may be through 
participation in the Centre’s Internal Program Review, field visits, staff 
presentations and dlscussions, or a mixture of these) and to how lt 
reports to the Board. The CommIttee’s report to the Board Is 
particularly Important in that it should Inform the Board on program 
suitability, development, performance and Impact; make suggestions and 
rccomaendatlons for the consideration of ?lanagement: and put before the 
Board specific recomendatlons of a policy nature on which decisions are’ 
required In relation to program matters. 
* 
To do this p: erly it is 
essential that there be a process of dialogue and Inter. mnge of ideas 
. 
,I ? -, 
’ .A i / 
with Hanagement and scientific staff. ,This interaction should p’roceed on 
a basis of mutual respect. Members of the Program Committee should al&. 
recognize the importance of their report to Management and scientific 
staff. Praise is taken as heavenly and criticism, even of the gentlest 
kind, hellishly. 
4.1.2.2. Wembershlp 
Because it is dealing with the Centre’s scientists and their work, . . 
the essentfal features of Program Co& &tee’ membetshAp.are, fltrst, that 
ft should encomPass the necessary range of expertise (if necessary by the 
use of sane honorary members or* as need be, consultants) and, second, 
that 1 ts penhers be of such status as to hdve the prof esslonal respect of 
scien tffic staff . Because of his or her role as the Board’s chief 
executive officer , the Director Cenerdl should not be a member of the 
Program Comulttee but, eXCept for in-CdJErd SeSSiOnS, should have d 
standhg invltatlon to attend its meetfngs. Relatedly, the Director 
&era1 - as chief executive officer - should facilitate the interaction 
between the Coanaittee and Program Leaders and their teams. 
Wrl Nng of the Program Connaf &tee * s report to the Board should be 
done by members of the Counafttee as designated by f&s chalrperson (who, 
of course, may do the job personally). To have a member of the Centre’s 
Management or staff do this wrk would be Inappropriate given the 
ComPlttee’s terms of reference. Nor, In a formal sense, does the 
Comalttee need a secretary - as far as logistical services are needed, 
these can be provided via the Secretary to the Board. As for any Board 
subcaunittee, the chairperson should be cunpetent gua chair. He or she 
should also possess such scientific status, experience and coaunonsense as 
to have the respect of the Conrmittee’s members, of the Management and. 
particularly, of scientific staff. 
4.1.2.3. Obtaining information. 
The Program Committee can only do its work if It has adequate 
information. One way,of obtaining this is by participation in the 
Centre’s Internal Program Review. This has pros and cons, however, as the 
presence of the Camnittee may prevent the Review from achieving its 
purpose of critical interplay between the scientific staff. Since this Is 
a Hanagent area, the decision on Program Caxmalttee participation should 
be left to the Director General. PeLhaps just new members of the Board - 
’ might attend as part of their lnductlrm. 
mentatlon and presentatlons,frcmr the research and training : 
programs must be a major means of the Program Caumlttee gaining necessary 
Information. In parti&lar, documentation should be available In good 
time -” the watchwrds should be not “thick and late” but “thin and 
early’ . Too, the efficiency of the Camalttee’s work will generally be 
enhanced by allocating particular areas of research and training to each 
Of its members in accordance with their expertIs and Committee needs. 
The Program Comaittee will also obtain Information through Informal 
contact with scientific staff - indeed, staff will often wish to have 
professional advice from relevant members of the Committee. Such Informal 
contacts can be very fruitful to the Program Camulttee but, as discussed 
In Section 4.3.3 below, q efnbers should always be cognizant of their Board 
role vis-a-vls that of the Director General, the Director of Research and 
Program Leaders. 
Vlthin the bound of reasonable cost, members of the Program Committee 
should also obtain Information by visits to field activities, not just 
those near headquarters but also those further afield. To this end. over 
a period of years, the Committee should cndeavour to structure a program 
of v&Its to all the Centre’s major field activities so as to obtain 
on-thespot appreciation of them - a side benefit to which Is the boost 
given to staff by the Board’s Interest. Such wider ranging field visits 
might be conducted%efore the annual meeting of the Board or, if judged 
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necessary, during the year. Of course, it should not be necessaky for all 
members of the Program CcXmaittee ‘to make all field trips. That could be 
too expensive in terms of both money and staff time. Scme field visits, 
for example, might best be made by the Committee’s chairperson accompanied 
by the Chairperson of the Board and perhaps the Vice-Chairperson. 
4.1.2.4. Frequency of meetings 
The Program Cqmmittee must meet at least annually to report to the 
Board. Depending on the size and stage of develo$nent of the Centre’s 
various programs, additional meetings may sometimes be necessary, perhaps 
ln conjunction with a field vlslt away from headquarters. Only under very 
special circumstances should It be necessary for the Program Comnittee to 
meet mre than twice in a year. 
4.1.3. Audit Caanit tee 
The function of an 
finance cotdttte. me 
Audit Coarnrlttec ls quite different from that of a 
two do not fit together particularly well in that, 
while the Dlrcctor General should actively participate ln finance 
deliberations, he or she should not bc a member of the Audit Corrrmittee. 
Auditing ls concerned with monitoring compllancc with controls. 
Necessarily it uses information covering past and present performance. In 
contrast, finance activities are forward looking ln terms of budgets, 
flnanclal planning and fundlng prospects - responsibility for uhlch might 
best lie with the Board’s Executive Committee rather .than a separate 
Qlnance Camnittee. 
4.1.3.1. Terms of reference 
The essence of the Audit Conrmittee's terms of reference is that it 
should advlse the Board on whe Cher or not the integrfty of the Centre Is 
being anlntdtned or 1s somehow fmpdfred. This integri ty has two 
dimensions: (II a findncidl one relating to the ddeqUdCy of, and 
compliance with) ftnancAa1 controls and the truthful reporting of 
. . c ’ 
finandal rcsulN; (2J an operational one relating to the effldency of 
operations and procedures, and tie nmnitoring of compl&mce with 
m3nagemenr policies. 
The establishment and monitoring of the efficacy of internal 
controls, whether ln the financial area or the operational area, Is a 
res&nslblllty of a corporation’s management. For this reason management 
InvarIably makes use of an external financial audit service, often 
supplemented by an internal financial audit unit (which, under the logic _- 
of ensuring integrity, should report dire& to the chief executive 
officer). . Horc frequently over recent years. with the aim of ensuring 
cost effectiveness, corporation management has also made use of 
operational audit services. 
Because of their fiduciary responslblllty, corporation boards are 
also vitally concerned with the efficacy of internal controls and the 
integrity of the corporation. For this reason, corporation boards 
generally have an Audit Caramittec which, increasingly, has not just a 
financial audit orientation but also an operational audit interest. 
Across the tXIAR Boards, the Audit Committee situation, as at 
mid-1987, ls quite mixed. Some Boards do anti :3me don’t. Some give 
financial audit responslblllty to a Qlnance Committee or their Executive 
Comnlttee where, under the pressure of other business, there must be 
significant risk of not dolng the job properly - not td mention the fact 
that the Director General Is often a member of these subcommittees. Few 
Boards, it seems, have yet come to grips with operatIona audltlng. The 
potential benefit of operational auditing 1s the amancement of cost 
effectiveness. The danger Is the Introduction of bureaucratic attitudes 
with process taking precedence over performance. 
A good example of detailed terms of reference for a 
financially-oriented Audit Committee are those for CIAT reproduced in 
Append lx 2. These come from the CIAT Board of Trustees Handbook (CIAT, 
1986, pp. 93-94$. Raybe the next edition of this will show an extension 
‘. . . . - \ 
/ 
“Iler/r Ilrc story, gerrdctturr. Sotrrctirr~ last trigh, at; rlrvctr-year- 
old kid irr Akrorr, Ohio, go; ho our cor~rputer arrd trarr$erred all 
our assets to a bank itt Zurich.” 
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Of the Audit Comaplttee’s responslblllties to a judicious degree of 
operational auditing! 
4.1.3.2. Membership 
Three or at most four would seem about the right number of members 
for &he Audit Coadttee. These members should bridge the 
management/financial and scientific disciplines and. Of course, should 
include at least one or twu of the Board's. expeqts in fbancial management 
and business admInistration. The Dlrectoi Gene& should not'be d member 
of the Audftcomaittee- just as In the context of the Nominations and 
Program Caxalttees, for Audit Committee purposes he or she Is a servant of 
the Board. Too, just as for other Board subcommittees and the Board 
Itself, the chairperson should be purposefully chosen In terms of his or 
her capacity to do the job well. 
4.1.3.3. Functlonlng 
The functlov of the Audit Coumalttee arc well spelt out ln the 
example of Appendix 2. Particularly important, ln terms of the Board’s 
formal responslblllty, are the Comlttee’s private discussions (I) with 
the external auditor and (II) with the internal auditor. Speclf lc 
questions that should be posed ln private discussion with the external 
auditor are: Were any limitations placed on the scope of the audit? Were 
there any particular conditions which led to a change ln the scope of the 
audit? Were any conflicts of interest found? Are there any major legal 
contingencies? Are there any financial problems or reporting questions of 
which the Audit Committee should be aware? 
Just as for the Program Committee. the Audi t Comrnl ttee's report to 
the Board should &e wrftten either by the chdlrperson of the ConnniCtee or 
by members of the Comraittee ds designated by fts chdlrperson. Given the 
CocrPnlttee’s terms of reference, It would be Inappropriate for Its report 
to be written by a member of the Centre’s Management or staff, or by the 
eXternal audi&Qr. Insofar as the Committee needs logistical services. 
.’ 
these CM be provided via the Secretary to the Board and, as ippropriatc, 
the Centre’s chief financial/administrative officer(s). Relative to the 
Camnittee’s information needs, major liaison will necessarily be with the 
Director General and his or her chief fi.nancial/adml.nlstrative officer(s). 
Because of the possibly sensitive nature of Its findings, it wduld 
seem wise for the report of the Audit Coarmi tree to caw to the Board via 
the Bxucut1ve C~ttf?e. 
. . 
Metfngs of the Aud.it Comnittee sboul’d be held annu~Uy -imaedlately 
before theBoard's annual meeting and should be so scheduled as to have 
dvdfldble the ducKted financial statements for the preceding fhmncfdl 
year. Only under very special circumstances should It be necessary for 
the Camaittee to met more than once in a year. 
4.1.4. Executive Camnittte 
Bwry Board must have dn Executive ComWttee and every Executive 
Coiorittee mst tdke care that At does not usurp the rfghts of Its Board. 
4.1.4.1. Terms of reference 
- mjor nsponslbilftles or roles should lie wIti &he Bxecutlve 
cooaittee: (II to act, as earpowered by the Board, on behalf of the board 
as nm?d ekes betueen full awetings of the Board; 121 to handle, wit;h the 
Board"s dcqulescence. sensltlve matters that dre best kept uAthfn d 
smaller rather than a larger group; (31 to act ds d ffnance subcommittee 
of the Board. The Executive Committee should not play the role of an 
audit subcomnlttec, nor that of a ncmlnations subcommittee. An example of 
Executive Camittee terms of reference, again frun CXAT (1986, p. 89). is 
given In Appendix 3. 
In actbag on behalf of tie full Board, &be Executive Commirtee mutt 
repart promptly (via minutes of f&s meetings) to all members of the Board 
and seek rdtiflmtfOn of its actions ar recommenddrions at tie next 
. , s -.; 
rectfnq of the Board. In contrast to business corporatlonst l.k the __ 
not-for-profit research context of CGIAR Centres, efficiency dictates that 
the Executive Ccmmittee encompass the role of finance subcommittee in 
monitoring income and expenditure, and in recommending annual budget 
proposals to the Board. Relative to sensitive issues handled-by the 
Executive Committee. It should act as a filter to the Board using 
judgment as to how much information it is essential for the Board to 
have. TM.s Is, of course, a difficult judgement contingent upon the 
Board’s goodwill. _ Conversely, at all times, the Executive Committee must :s 
take care that it does not exceed Its authority-and act as a-rump of the 
Board. Board members should be on their guard against this possibility. 
Thei should never regard the recommendations of the Executive Committee as 
sacrosanct - that way lies the rubber-stamp label. At the same time, the 
Executive Coaxittee can act as a sounding board for the Chairperson and 
the Director General. 
4.1.4.2. rkmbershlp 
Unless otherwise constrafned by &he Centre’s By-ldus, &he EXecutfve 
Comaittee should be c&tired by the Board's Chairperson and hdve as members 
the chair~rsons of tie Program, Audit and Nomtnarlons Committees, the 
Board Vice-chairperson and the Director Cenera.2. If the Board is large 
enough, the Committee might also include another member of the Board. The 
Chairperson needs to be a member as part of his or her overall 
rtsponslbility; the Vice-Chairperson so as to be Informed In case he or 
she -has to act as Chairperson; the Director General because of his or her 
role as chief executive: and Cumittec chairpersons in order to bring the 
perspective of their Committees to the deliberations and also to ensure 
Inter-Committee liaison. If feasible, a non-officer member of the Board 
should be Included to help allay the possible suspicion of an elite 
establishment rump. As need be, the Executive Committee should coopt 
other members of the Board. Its secretary should be the Board’s Secretary. 
4.1.4.3. Rlnct ioning 
The Ececutlve Committee should meet immediately before Board meetings 
to handle financial and other pressing matters for which recommendations 
to the Board are needed. To enable Board business to be expedited, the 
Committee should have at least two and perhaps three meetings per year, 
thereby possibly saving the cost of a full Board meeting. Business so 
handled, however, must be with the approval and subsequent ratification of 
the Board. Too, for the benefit of its members and of field staff, - 
rid-term meetings of the Executive Committee might ‘&netlmes proflfably be 
held away fran headquarters. Members should also keep their bags packed 
in case an emergency situation dictates that a special meeting Is needed. 
To pee t their ongoing responslbilf ty to monl tor the Cen tre 's 
firrancial si tuatlon, each member of the Executl we Comni ttee should rece1 ve 
at ledst quarterly d stdrement s umdrfxing the Centre’s f1nancia.l 
sl tution. This should be prepared by the Centre’s chief financial 
officer in a standard format, not as a major exercise with fine detail, 
but with sufficient information for the Committee to shut the stable door 
If the horse looks like bolting. The cautionary rider (a!) to this Is 
that fhe’E?xecutlve Comittce must take care to restrict its role to 
monitoring. It should not seek understanding to such degree that It gets 
Involved In management with consequent misunderstandings and frustration 
all round. 
’ 4.1.5. Ad Hoc Subcooaaittees ’ 
As noted in Section 4.1 above, fran time to time the Board may 
expeditiously make use of ad hoc subcommittees to handle Important matters 
of a one-off or transitory nature. 
4.1.5.1. Search Committee for a Director General 
A prime exwte of an ad hoc subccxmulttee Is the Search Cmmittee for 
a new Director General, the choice of whom - as many have said - Is the 
. . , 
one big decision 6 Board may have to make. Obviously, this Search 
Camlttee must be chosen with great care. It should be chaired by thi 
Board’s Chairperson and include two or three of the Board’s Gisest and 
rmst experienced members, and might fruitfully be complemented by one or 
two disinterested outsiders with like attributes. Its search should le& 
to a shortlist of two or three for final choice by the Board. Procedure 
td be followed by the Search Ccmmittee should be established beforehand 
and be of obvious integrity. Guides to possible processes of search and 
selection are available fran the records held by the CGIAR Secretariat of .w 
how it has been done In the past. Indeed, a Board facing a:search for a 
new Director General would be well advised to invite the CG Secretariat 
officer responsible for Board liaison to meet with it to advise on 
possible procedures In the light of past expertence. 
4.2. Officers of the Board 
The Board's officers consist of the Chairperson, the 
Vke-chalrperson, the chairpersons of its standing committees, its 
Director General as chief executive officer, and the Secretary to the 
Board. Pro tern, there will also 
subcocmnittees. 
4.2.1. Chairperson of the Board 
The Chairperson presides at 
all matters with which the Board 
be the chairpersons of any ad hoc 
all meetdngs of the Board and supervises 
Ip concerned. He or she 1s responsible 
for providing leadership to the Board in determfnlng the policies under 
ufalch f ts Director General will opera&e the Centre. 
The role of the Chairperson relates to both Internal matters 
involving the Board and the Centre and external matters lying beyond t3e 
Cent re . llajor Internal matters involve: (1) liaison with Xanagement to 
ensure Board appreciation of tYanagement perspectives and needs: 
(2) liaison with Hanagement to facilitate lmplementatlon of Board 
decks Ions : (4) uorklng with Board-subcommittee chairpersons and the 
Director General to decide on the frequency of meetings and t’o thWk 
through and prepare agendas for the meetings of the Board and its’ 
subcaamittees: and (4) ensuring that the Board’s workload is kept 
manageable and is distributed among Its members so as to make the best use 
of their talents and limited time. The Chairperson also serves Board 
needs in such ways as: keeping members abreast of deliberations of the 
CGIAR,‘tha work of the Cc Secretariat and of TAC; issuing Invitations to 
new Board members and being responsible for their orientation; having 
private chats with members on their performance: and, as occasion might 
warrant, conducting exit Interviews with depat’tlng.kers. It is not a’ 
part of the Chairperson’s role to becoaw Involved In the actual management 
of the Centre. That Is the Director General’s job. 
For external matters, the Chairperson may represent the Centre as 
appropriate but, unless of a routine natUre, this should be done only on 
the basis of prior consultation with the Director General. Participation 
in cXIAB meetings Is an Important responslbilfty, with the Chairperson 
joixilng the Director General In representlng’the Centre. The Chairperson 
should also participate in meetings of the WIttee of Board Chairpersons 
and is expected to assist the Director General In developing and 
malntainlng good relations with donors, the CGIAR, TAC and the 
Secretariats. .Partlclpatlon of the Chairperson in external l ctivltlcr 
should be aimed at ensuring continuing donor confidence and interest, and 
at facilitating coamwnlcatlon and understanding among all elements of the 
CGIAR System (Hardin, 1984, p.16). 
4.2.1.1. Attributes 
Leadership has various styles. Nonetheless, the Chairperson needs 
certain attributes If he or she Is successfully to lead the Board. 
Obvfously fmportaM attrfbutes &hat the ChaIrperson must have are: 
(1) the respect of members by virtue of qualIffcatlons, experience, 
commonsense and personal integrity; 
t\ 
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“Gentlemen, I’m afraid I have some rather 
unfortunate news about our Centre..n 
. 
f:v) 
fv) 
(vi) 
4.2.1.2. 
& ability to run muI tinational meet~s eff ectf ve19 with * 
engendering of a Board approach rather than a.representatl+e one 
by Embers, and with adequate dfscusslon opportUAty for all 
members and observers; 
the diplomacy and presence, a3 need be, to handle Internal and 
external xaatters effectdvely; 
an appreciation of the Board's role vis-a-vis that of the 
Director General and that of other elements of the CCIAR System; 
a personality and style compatible with that of the Director . . 
General (who should be canvassed in this regard by:the 
Nomina tlons Conmittee); 
fhe capacl ty, as need be, to stay cool and to stand up to the 
Director General; aqd 
the capacity, if need be, to act pro tent as Director Genera. 
Tenure 
The Chairperson’s term of office was discussed In Section 3.4.8 where 
It was argued that he or she might best be Initially appointed to the 
chair at the start of his or her second term. Assuxlng careful choice by 
the Board, this would virtually guarantee a total of three years in office 
(one year initially, folloued by a further two years) and give a 
thrctycar rotation of the chair. A posslblc lmpllcatlon of this 
strategy. If followed. Is that the Chairperson would not have had the 
experience of chairing a standing counnittee of the Board. If so. this 
reinforces the argument that the Chairperson must be a person of 
considerable successful experience before election to the Board. 
Conversely, as a corollary of such a strategy, standing committee 
chairpersons may never succeed to the Board chair since they are unlikely 
to become an officer of the Board in their first term. 
An alternative to the above would be to always give the Chairperson a 
t-year term- However, this would barely give sufficient tenure for the 
Chairperson to learn the ropes and have an Impact unless, of course. he or 
she had suffJclent time left on the Board to serve two two-year terms. If 
not, such an approach would also have the.dl.sadvantage of Implying a new 
Chairperson every tw years which, nonetheless, would be distinctly better 
than frequently having a Chairperson in office for only a one-year tern. 
4.2.1.3. Availability * 
&ending on the size and canplexlty of the Centrc, the demdn~ on 
ti chatrperson my be of the order of 30 to 60 days in an ordinary Ye= 
(more than &his WVUA$ suggest he or she is fnterferlng with MagerrPntl 
and sm 30 per cent nure fn an externat revf’ew yeG. Boards must be sure 
that a proposed chafrperson can clear the necessary time. If need be, the 
&ard should be prepared to pay &be release time costs in order to get the 
rlgh t person. ~hls play be necesary, for example, If the proposed 
Chairperson Is self-employed. Far better to provide such reimbursement 
than to adopt the second- or third-best solution of giving the Board chair 
to a less-suited person-who has time to spare and/or an employer willing 
to bear the cost. This problem, of course, also occurs in terms of 
recruitment to the Board and helps explain the preponderance of academics 
(pUrtiCUlarly cx-Deans) on the CC Secretariat’s file of potential Board 
mcmbcrs. Suffice to note,ln passing that, while an ex-Dean may have had 
wide experience Ln research administration, he or she may have had little 
experience with corporate planning, auditing, cost effectiveness, staff 
policies. relevance of programs to mandates, etc. To put It rhetorically, 
do Boards contain too many pcoplc who do not have the time for the job or 
do they contain those who do have the time but (Tossell excepted) don’t 
have the relevant management expertise? 
4.2.1.4. Effectiveness 
As well as the preceding considerations, there are others that 
impinge on the Chairperson’s effectiveness. He or she should be provided 
ulth necessary support in terms of secretarial assistance and linkage to 
CZNET. Ccmpatlblllty and good working relations with the Director General 
are of obvious importance and, for the benefit of both, should be 
approached with g&d will by both. 

The chairperson’s effectiveness can also be greatly enhanced by a : 
degree of prior Induction and orientation. This Is probably best done by 
naming him or her as Chairperson-designate a year ahead and providing 
opportunities to learn the ropes through attendance at International 
Centres’ Week, discussions with the CCIAR Secretariat’s management, 
finance and Board specialists, attendance as an observer at a meeting of 
the CoaPPittee of Board Chairpersons, etc. The Chairperson-designate 
mechanism would also allcu the person to arrange adjustments In his or her 
time schedule so as to meet Board and CGIAR needs. Host importantly, It 
would provide the impetus for both him or her ‘tid the ,Director Gener.al to 
get to know one another better with a view to ensuring the effectiveness 
of their future working relationship. 
The Board, of course, and also the CGIAR System, has a significant 
stake ln the effectiveness of the Chairperson. For this reason. tie 
Board must monitor his or her performance and be hardheaded enough to 
replace the Chairperson if he or she is not effective. To this end the 
Board should, in his or her absence but with the Director General 
revfew the Chairperson's performance each year. (Likewise, there 
be en analogous review of the Director General’s performance each 
4.2.2. Vice-Chairperson of the Board 
. 
The ViCe-ChdlrperSOn should be a senior Board member who is 
present, 
should 
year. ) 
qudlffied to assume full chair responsibilities when required. For this 
reason, the position should in no sense be regarded as a sinecure, nor as 
a position which must be occupied by a host-government nominee. He or she 
should maintain continuing liaison with the Chairperson to ensure smooth 
functioning of the Board. . 
4.2.3. Standlnq Ccmmlttee Chairpersons 
Just as the Board needs an effective Chairperson. so too do Its 
standing commit tees. For the Executive Committee this need should be 
satisfied by kving the Board Chairperson as Its chair. This leaves the 
* ., - 
Audit, Program and Nodnations -Ittees. of these, tbr, madnatIons 
ColPaittee has particular importance In determining the sustained 
effectiveness of the Board. Special care should therefore apply to the 
selection'of fts Chdlrperson. In no sense should this position (or 
membership of the Camnittee) be used merely to give somebody a job.who 
would not otherwise have a significant role. Indeed, in assessing the 
Board’s membership resource In terms of capacity to chair and lead, after 
the question of leadership of the Board Itself, priority should be given 
to leadership of the Eianlnatlons Ca&.ttec. Prm this It follows that one 
possibility to be considered would be for the bard’< Vice-Chalrpgrson 
also to chair-the Nominations Camaittet. For the Audit and Program 
Cormnlttces, relevant professional background and capacity to lead are both 
important considerations in the choice of a chairperson. This, however. 
should be no problem as long as the Board has adequately planned its 
membership to ensure needed strengths. 
As well as leading their subcommittees effectively, the chairpersons 
of the Audit and Program Committees are responsible for the Interaction 
between their Ccumltttes and Centre ?Yanagement and staff. This 
interaction should be managed rather than unmanaged and should always be 
arranged In consultation with the Director General or his nominees. The 
Audit and Program Conaalttees' chArpersons must take care that nefther 
thefr Camaittees nor indfvldual members run wild. 
4.2.4. Secretary to the Board 
Each CCIAR Board should have a designated Secretary so as to ensure 
compliance with the requirement to keep adequate records. To ensure 
objectivity. the Secretary should not be a member of the Board but should 
_ & d member of the Cen tre ’ s Hanagemen t team. This helps to ensure that 
he or she Is knowledgeable, competent and able to facilitate the Board’s 
activities. A workable procedure would be for the Secretary to be 
appointed by the Board for renewable two-year terms, the recommendation 
for appalntment or renewal coming to the Board from the Director General 
In consultation wi?h the Chairperson. 
It is the sec,-etary's responsibiIfty to a&.atrdin the‘fuU set of 
off fcial documents pertain2ng to the Board, Including the offfcial redrds 
of Board and Zxecutive CommIttee meetlngs. Other elements of the 
Secretary’s job are to serve as secretary at Board and Executive Ccnrmittee 
meetings: in coordination with the Chairperson and the Director General, 
to notify Board members of the meetings of the Board and Its ccxmalttees: 
td coordinate the preparation and distribution of Board meeting papers and 
other relevant documentation; to maintain the Centre’s Board Handbook: and 
to assist the officers and members of the Board in logistical - 
arrangements. The scope of these duties dbvlou;ly Indicates that the 
Secretary.must be a parson of calm and competence who has the confidence 
of the Chairperson and the Director General. Too, he or she must have the 
ability to serve both the Board (as Secretary) and the Director General 
(as a staff member) without getting the two roles mixed i.n undesired ways. 
As suggested In Section 3.4.7, the Secretary to the Board might also 
best serve as secretary to the NominatAons Committee. In particular, 
this implies malntatiing the files of the Nominations Cormnlttee and 
necessary liaison with the CGIAR Secretariat ln the CC-nominee process. 
In this capacity he or she should also assist the CG Secretariat in the 
development and maintenance of Its file of current and potential Board 
members. 
4.2.5. Chief Executive Officer 
The Director General is appointed by the Board as its chief 
executive officer with the responsibility to operate the Centre In 
accordance wt th polf cf es determined by the Board. Choice of Its chief 
executive officer Is the most Important decision a Board ever makei. As 
discussed In Section 4.1.5.1 above. this selection must be made very 
carefully, 
Being both a full member (ex officio) of the Board and its chief 
servant, the Director General - unless constrained - could sometimes face 
what might (it&s hoped) be described as benign conflicts of interest. 
For this reason. as previously noted, It is inappr6priatt for the Director 
General to be a member of the Board’s Audit, Program or Nominations 
Committees. Less clearcut is the question of whether the Director General 
should vote in Board elections. Perhaps a reasonable working rule would 
be for him or her to abstain unless the good of the Centre is perceived to 
demand otherwise. It is, however, a matter on which opinions differ. 
Technically, of course, as a full member of the Board, he or she is 
legltlmately entitled to vote. 
m  
Because of the crucial lxportauk of his br hei-role i.n managing the 
Ccntre, the Director General’s perfommce should be reviewed annually by 
the Board but not.ln his or her prembce. Since not even a Director 
General (or a chairperson) can be perfect, this annual review will need to 
be folland up by a tete-a-tete between the Chairperson and the Director 
General to relay necessary messages - positive and negative - comFng from 
the Board’s appraisal of performance. The Director General will also 
receive somewhat less dir&t signals via the Board’s annual decision on 
his or her salary for the caning year. 
Clrcmstance may occasionally necessitate that’ there be an Acting 
Director General. If SO* this appointment should be confirmed by the 
Board and the appointee recognized as having full responslblllty and ex 
officio membership of the Board pro tern. 
4.2.5.1. Tenure 
The Director General should be appofnted for an fnitfal term of, 
say, six to eight years subject to satisfactory performance and open ko 
renewal for further specfffed &emu If mutually agreeable. This is 
preferable to appointment of the Director General for an Indefinite term 
because it gives the Board additional flexibility. 
“We CUR stfll be friends, Gus. I fust donft 
want you to be my deputy mymore.” 
4.3. Ward-Centre 3elations 
L 
As outlined in Secticn 2.1 above;the Board as a whole and its 
Individual members as trustees are In a position of responsibility and 
trust relative to the Centre. This fact should guide the Board and Its 
Individual sembers in all their relations with the Centre. As well, 
precise guidance on Board-Centre relations should be made available to 
Board nambers by fncludIng in the Centre's Board Handbook d clear 
stdteorent of the respons1biU ties of each of the Board's officers ad .a 
standing committees, ds well ds of the Board is d whole. This can do 
much to help avoid misunderstandings. To the same end, Board meetings 
should occasionally Include a discussion of the Board’s role and hou it 
right best Interface with’nanagement and staff. 
4.3.1. Relations with the Director General 
Respect for each other's roles and mutual trust should be the basis 
of relations between the Board and 1&s Director Gmerdl. Prom the 
Board’s side, this implies above all that the Board should take 
mtkulous care not to interfere In management. That Is the Director 
General’s role. It also Implies that the Boa.rd shouZd gfve serious 
considerdtlon (but not dct as d rubber-stamp) to the views and advice of 
its Director General. He or she knows the Centre and its current 
circumstances Ear more Intimately than the Board: In a sense, he or she 
lives with It while the Board just flies In and out now dnd again. 
Likewise. the Board must take most seriously its zesponsfbfl~ty for’the 
establishment of Board-Approved policAes, strateglies and program budget 
under whfch the Df rector General 2s to manage the Centre. Except on 
purpose, the Board should not be Indecisive. 
Gr~enwccd (,1980. pp. l-2) has well described a successful 
relationship between a Board and Its Director General as “a synbiotlc cne 
in which the Board depends on the Chief Executive for dynamic and 
visionary leadership [of the Centre, not the Board!] while he [or she!] 
looks to the,Board for authority. direction, advice and support. The 
ad can normally ln this situation concentrate on being uell informed ,, 
and responsive ln a critical but positive mar&er to the initiatives and 
proposals of the Director General. * As Hardin (1984, p. 10) notes, such a 
symbiotic relationship enables the Board and the Director General to 
achieve far more than either could alone. 
obviously the Board and Its Director General share the objective of 
-king sure the Centre is successful. Since the Director General Is the 
person who, core thaq anyone else, Is going to make it succeed, and the - 
Board Is responsible for ensuring that he or'she &ES, there Js.bo logic 
in anything. othet than full support by the Board for its Director Gmeral 
as long as he OP she is perfonalng satfsfactorlly. Conversely, If the 
Director ceneral's perforamnce is unsatisfactory and he or she 1s 
unresponsive to Board advIce and Instructions of a policy nature, then - 
just as in the case of an Inadequate Chairperson - the Director General 
should be replaced. The need for such decisions by a Board should of 
course be extremely rare. It will certainly be so to the extent that the 
Board takes care in choosing Its Director General and ln ensuring that lt 
behaves effectively as a Board. Nonetheless, such a decision may 
sofaetlmes be necessary. If SO, It should not be shirked and shoul’d be 
made with decisiveness, toughness, yet canpassion. 
. 
Support for Its Director General does not mean that the Board should 
never differ fraa him or her In the process of Board deliberation about 
* pollcics. strategies and program budgeting. But the resolution of such 
differences should occur through discussion and eventual agrctinent with 
give and take, not by disagreement and confrontation (Solandt, 1979). 
Boards need neither clowns nor prima donnas! 
AS part of Its responsibility to ensure its Director Genefal’s 
effectiveness, a Board must appreciate his or her circumstances. He or 
she is doing a job most Board members could not do. The position is a 
particularly responsible one, often lonely. socially demanding, hard on 
family, conducive to zeal, overwork and stress. and loaded with pressure 
coming from both fhslde and outside the Centrc. No wonder that a Director 
*.... -_I 
V------W. 
“h- fiusain, according to our study the Putholoyist wus lost for 
want of a in&, the Program was losf for want of a Pathologist, 
and the DG was lost for rvarpt of a Program, but the Centr-e was lost because of Board interference in manaoernenf.” 
x 
. 
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“Danrrr!” 
v- . . 
General may need a sabbatical occasionally to give him or her a break and 
a chance for reflection, and no mnder that he or she may be rather touchy 
- and rightfully so - when faced with a Board that is seemingly Wiil~ully 
uninformed, disinterested (or - at the other extreme - so interested as to 
be interfering), irresponsible in its decision making, and with.scxne of 
its members using their Board membership to serve their own ends. If the 
No&nations Canmittee does Its work properly, such a caricature of a Board 
cannot occur. But if such a Board were to exist, it Is to be hoped that 
the System’s organization would be porous enough for the Director General .m 
to consult with the Chairman of the Group ofi the’problem he or.khe and the 
Centre fats. 
The real danger that the Board has to beware of In its relationship 
with the Director General Is that occasional minor tetchlness or error on 
either side does not snowball into something more serious and lead to 
mutual loss of confidence that grows cumulatively upon Itself. Part of 
the Chairperson’s role must be to nip such posslbllltles In the bud. Too, 
to reduce the potential for such fracas, the chairperson of the 
Naainatlons Ccaxnlttee should always consult with the Director General 
about possible naulnatlons for Board membership to ensure that there are 
no incompatlbilitles or conflicts of Interest that might lead to blow ups. 
4.3.1.1. Chairperson-Director General relations 
All that has been said above on relations between the Board and the 
Director Gener.81 applies even more strongly to the Chairperson of the 
Board in his or her relations with the Director General. The Chairperson 
and the Dh?ctor General must have mutual trust and respect: Each must 
recognize the key role and the respbnsibility borne by the other. They 
should not keep relevant Information from one another, nor play tricks 
with each other. They should work at having sound rapport. be willing and 
able to talk openly, freely and bluntly to one another to air problems or 
grievarzzes. have constructive critical discussions, and provide mutual 
support. All this tiplies not only informality and warts-and-all 
%\ 
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Wceptance, but also the capacity for formality when the occasion demands 
it (as in the annual tete-a-tete following the Board’s appraisal of ‘the 
Director General’s performance). 
Rapport berween the Chairperson and the Director General is 
especfally important to &he Board's functioning in two partIculat ways: 
ffrst, in the developrrrent of agendas for met? tIngs of the Board and f&S 
standhg coaaal trees; and, second, in the provislon of necessary 
documentation and presen tstfons for such meetings. Just as for the * _w 
Chairperson, because of his or her responslbllltles; the Director’ General 
should alwayqbe lnvolved ln the development and preparation of meeting 
agendas. Conversely, because of Its responsibllltles, the’Board should 
never want for available information pertinent to Its decision making. 
Roth these needs of having appropriate agendas and appropriate Information 
Can be met satisfactorily Only if the Chairperson and the Director General 
work well together. 
i-3.2. Relations with Xanasemnt 
gu Hanagement Is meant the Director General plus those few people 
immdlatcly below him or her In the Centrc’s hierarchy who form the 
ranagemcnt group. Sometimes the Board will work or liaise with this group 
as a whole. at other times with Individual members of It - for example, 
the Program Camlttee with the Director of Research and the Audit 
Coamlttee with the Director of Administration. Agaln truit and mutual 
respect should be the basis of relations. The Board and its members 
should take care to foster and not hinder the ‘teanmess’ of Management. 
fn particular, it should do nothing which undermines &be authority of the 
Director Gmerdl and should in no way play off one member of Hanagement 
ag&nSt mother. 
Just as the Board’s Chairperson must have special liaison with the 
Director General, so too must the chairpersons of the Program and Audit 
Committees work closely with their respective counterparts In the Centre’s 
management team. %I ey should take particular care that their Committees 
. . ’ . . ’ 
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“You can’t fire me. I’m the DG! ” 
w 
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d o  n o t w e  excess ive  d e m a n d s  fo r  in fo rmat ion  in  te rms  o f e i ther  v o l u m e , 
d e tai l  o r  dead l ines .  L ikewise,  th e y  shou ld  e n s u r e  th a t the i r  C o m m i tte e s  
p lay  a ’s u p p o r t ive adv isory  m o n i to r ing  ro le  a n d  in  n o  w a y  a  superv isory  o r  
snooperv iso ry  ro le.  
4 .3 .3 . Re la t ions  wi th S ta ff 
S ta ff o f a  C e n tre consists  o f b o th  th e  scient i f ic staff a n d  th e  
s u p p o r t staff. T h e  B o a r d  a n d  its x iembers  s h o u .ld ,$ o  al l  th e y  c a n  to  .- 
suppr t  the DitgctO r G e n e r a l  in  th e  m a i n te n a n c e  o f g o o d  staff fe la t ions  
wh i le  A n  n o  w a y  u n d e r m i n In g  h fs o r  he r  a u thori ty.  Just  as  m u c h  as  wi th 
scient i f ic staff, B o a r d  m e m b e r s  shou ld  shcu  f r iendly interest  in  th e  work  
a n d  we l fa re  o f s u p p o r t staff. A ll a re  in  th e  C e n tre fami ly ;  a l l  h a v e  a  
ro le  In  ensu r i ng  Its success.  
In  ta lk ing  wi th staff, as  S o l a n d t ( 1 9 7 9 , A n n e x , p . 2 )  n o tes,  B o a r d  
m e m b e r s  shou ld  b e  carefu l  n o t to  act  o r  s p e a k  In  ways  th a t m ight  b e  
In te rp re ted  as  inst ruct ions o r  dec is ions,  a n d .a lways  to  repor t  to  th e  
Di rector  G e n e r a l  th e  resul ts  o f a n y  s igni f icant  conversa t ions  o f a  
n o n - c o n fid e n tia l  n a ture.,  Too,  m e m b e r s  shou ld  r e a l & e  th a t th e y  Inev i tab ly  
p lay  a  cathart ic  ro le  fo r  s o m e  staff (or  the i r  spouses )  w h o , at th e  tim e  
o f th e  B o a r d ’s visit, n e e d  to  g e t a  fe w  th ings  o ff the i r  chest.  Th is  Is 
n a tural ,  par t  o f a n y  fami ly ,  a n d  n o t to  b e  e x a g g e r a te d  in  Its 
s lgnl f lcance.  In d e e d , g iv ing  th e  o p p o r tuni ty  fo r  such  cathars is  Is o n e  o f 
. th e  ma jo r  r easons  (apar t  f rom soc ia l  in teract ion a n d  ensu r i ng  th a t th e  
B o a r d  Is not  a  set o f face less  n a m e s  to  staff) fo r  hav ing  soc ia l  occas ions  
a t th e  tim e  o f B o a r d  m e e tln g s . 
4 .4 . E x te rna l  Re la t ions  o f th e  B o a r d  
U  Fart  o f its, r?sponsib iL l t ies .  a  B o a r d  ‘inev i tab ly  h a s  a  d e g r e e  o f 
in teract ion wl th th e  ex terna l  e n v i r o n m e n t. .Thls ex terna l  In te rac t ion  h a s  
two e l e m e n ts: (1)  re la t ions wi th d o n o r  a n d  cl ient  c o u n try agenc ies  a n d  (2)  
re la t ions wi th o the r  e n titles  in  th e  C G IA R  System.  
* 
4.4-l. pelatlons with Donors and Clients 
The rcsponsIbfli&y for planned formal relations with donor and 
client governnaznts through their relevant agencies should lie ufth the 
Dfrectot General. He or she knows the past history and current 
situation, the personalities involved, the rules that apply and the 
Centre’s requirements. As appropriate, the Director General should make 
use of the Chairperson and other Board members In this activity and, in 
particular, of host-government members In host-country relations. If 
these formal contacts are not coordinated by’the Director General, the 
Centre runs. the risk of crossed wires. Informal contacts will, of course, 
also occur. As tar as possible, members of the Board should use these to 
facilitate the work of the Centre but should be careful In no way to 
colmolt the Board or the Centre. They should Inform the Director General 
of any significant matters that may arise In such informal contacts so 
that any necessary follow-up can be taken. 
4.4.2. Relations with CGIAR Entities 
As -11 as horfzontal relations with other CCIAR Centres, a Centre 
has vertical relations with the TAC and CCIAR Secretariats, TAC and the 
croup. 
4.4.2.1. Other CGIAR Centres 
?ran the Board’s point of view, the Centre’s horizontal relationships 
with other Centres are easiest. These are working relationships concerned 
with mandate Implementation and thus lie within the Director General’s 
responsibility of managing the Centre’s operation. The Board's role, 
recognizing its respnsibil~ty to both the Centre and the CCIAR System at 
ldrqe. fS t0 ensure thd& the Director General follows d policy of 
appropriate IJafson, faciliratlon, coopetatlon and coordfnatlon ln 
relation to sister Ct?ntr.??S ds priOri&feS permlc and CJrcmstances 
requf re. At the Board level, this ambience of positive cooperation can 
t\ 
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be fostered by having a degree of overlapping membership and, & 
appropriate, by the participation of representative members frcm other 
Boards in meetings and field visits of the Beard or its Program Committee. 
Inter-Centre relationships can also be facilitated via the’Board 
Chairperson’s liaison with other Board chairs In the Committee of Board 
Chairpersons: likewise through the Director General’s membership of the 
camnittee of Directors General known as the Group of Centre Directors. 
. . .- .- 
4.4.2.2. Secretariats, TAC and the CGIAR ’ 
The Board's vertical reldtionshlps In the System can best be v&wed 
as fitting into a clearly defined hlerarchical structure of checks and 
balances. ThAs structure involves: 
f1J assessment of the performance of the Director General as vfeued 
by 
(ii) the Board, whose performance In turn is the subject of review by 
fliiJ the Chala of the CCIAR, in ,consul tation and wAth the ddvfce 
of TAC, the CCIAR Secretarfdt and the Cosponsors, for the ' 
ult&aate sanction of 
Ifv) the donors. 
This was aptly summarized by the Chairman of the CGIAR at Its 1985 
mid- term meet lng in Tokyo as 'The Boards are responsible for &he Centres 
but the CGIAR nmnages the System.' 
In providing advice to the CGIAR on Board and Centre performance. TAC 
and the CGIAR Secretariat use two mechanisms. First, there Is continuous 
monitoring carried out through the review of Centre Program and Budget 
Troposals. annual reErts and other documentation, and atto3dancz as 
observers at Board meetings. Second, there is the mechanism of perlcdlc 
peer review via the External Program Review and External Management 
Review. These processes of ongoing monltorlng and perlodlc peer review 
offer &he Board,(and HdJYagementl the opportunlry of advice. It is one of 
&he W 's respnsibilitAes to ensure that tilts oppotcmiry is &en and 
the advfce ser;fowZy considered. ~ls is f&s rdght as an autonowus body, 
the Board does nor have to accept the proffered advice. In doing so it 
must be sure that ir has sound reasons and that it has taken account of 
the possible consequences to itself, its Centre and the System: Thus the 
Board might conscionably approve Its Director General’s decision not to 
follow an External Program or External Management Review recommendation 
that the Centre have an extra staff member of sane type. It would be most 
unwise, however, nqt to accept a recommendation that the continued - 
existence of so(pe Program be reviewed or thdt the-Board’s mcdt&ing of 
the Centre.‘s financial situation be strengthened. 
Judgements about such questions can be difficult, in part because of 
the Increasing site (in budget terms) and complexity of the System as the 
number of donors and clients Increases. Inevitably, this has led to 
questions of cost effectiveness and financial accountability with 
concanitant formalization and bureaucratization of the System. Gone are 
the (probably apocryphal) days when one of the System’s seminal Centres, 
If In need of money. simply sent Its sponsor a telexed request for “x mas 
kilos of big ones.’ 
Grc&ng site, complexity and Impact of the System, as well as the 
clearer demarcation of actors’ roles, has also Inevitably led to a degree 
of CGIAR politics. Though a predictable natural phenomenon in an entity 
as large as the CGlAR System, Boards need to be aware and conscious of 
this. A potted (and surely ldlosyncractlc) Interpretation of System 
history since Its formation in 1971 gives the background. Initially there 
weft just Centres, Directors General, Boards and the cCS[AR. Vlth just a 
few Centres. the System was relatively small and most of those involved 
knew one another. Funding seemed a free good. Formality and bureaucracy 
were at a minlmum. Directors General made the running for the System, 
Boards being relatively passive and largely science-oriented. As a 
mechanism to avoid donors having to conduct their own individual 
assessments of Centres’ research competence and performance, and to 
provide overall ~ientiflc guidance “L Centres and the System. TAC was 
. .* 
“I have distressing news, ladies and gentlemen. It seems we have 
been penetrated by TAC.” 
w 
. 
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then establishes and External Program Reviews introduced. Being 
scientifically oriented, it was natural that’ TAC’s liaison developed in” 
large part with the Directors General who operated the Centres. In turn, 
this gave stimulus to the Directors General to more firm ly establish and 
liaise on matters of mutual concern via the Group of Centre Directors. 
Meanwhile, under the pressure of financial constraints evident in the 
early 198Os, External Hanagement  Reviews were introduced and Boards began 
to realize that unless they raised their profile and began to better 
recognize and dispatch their responsibilities, donors - through the CGIAR - 
- would be looking to some other means of attaining the expected 
restralnt,.disclpllne and management  needed in the System. In 
consequence,  Boards, Directors General, TAC and the CGIAR Secretariat 
(through Its f inance and, more recently, management  advisory roles) became 
more equal actors or elements In the System. Concomitantly, so that their 
overall perspective could be developed and promulgated, Boards raised 
their profile and strengthened their position by the establishment of a  
more formal Committee of Board Chairpersons, thereby (In parallel with the 
Group of Centre Directors) giving themselves a  platform In the System. 
Predictably, as these developments occurred, the existing dominant actors 
tended to look askance at the new entrants on  the stage. Too, such growth 
has also inevitably led to a  loss of Informality, greater complexity and 
increased bureaucracy with, in the view of some, consequent erosion of 
vltality and effectiveness. 
. 
One  message for the Board out of all this Is that it must recognize 
that it Is part of the Cc System. In recognizing its own role and rights, 
It must also be cognizant of those of other System elements and. for the 
ongoing good of the System, should take care not to upset the System’s 
stability. Partnership and cooperation should be the approach, not an 
attitude of ‘us vs. them”. Obligations to other System elemeits should be 
act wllllny?ly whether they be in the form of giving serious consideraticn 
to advice received, acceding to reasonable requests for information or 
Implementing System-wide policies. 
. 
. .a 
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A significant difficulty arising from  these considerations relates to 
the demarcation between the Board“s and the Director General’s 
responsibilities. On the one hand, there is enhanced recognition that the 
Board’s role is to set policy under which the Director General PLaYs his 
or her role of managing the Centre. on the other hand, the Board iS at 
the same time expected by the CGZAR to be fully informed about the 
Centre’s programs and activities to the extent, for example, that It can 
meaningfully develop a strategy and Aong-term  plan for the Centre for 
presentation to TAC. This paradox d not interfering in Centre management - 
yet being adequately Informed can be overcome only through a good 
understanding between the Board and bnagement. They need to work 
together in an interactive way. Thu, as suggested in the 1986 ILCA 
External t4anagement Review Report, In the development of policy, strategy 
and budget, and particularly a Centre’s Long-term  Plan, “Management using 
Center staff (and consultants’lf necessary) does the staff work, helps 
Identify and analyse key issues and brings them forward in a structured 
fashion for joint Board-Management deliberation and resolution.” 
Likewise, in program review, “detailed reviews and evaluations are carried 
out through an ongoing institutional process. The detailed work Is done 
bY Staff arid Consultants of acceptable quality t0 the Board. The Board 
approves and loorritors the process employed and fully shares In the use of 
the p&duct. = . 
Another consequence of the growth of the System and desire for its 
accountability Is the upward creep of bureaucratization and 
standardization. Inevitably, due to the needs of the =IAR. the 
Secretariats in turn need more information and, for comparative purposes. 
the more standardized It is across Centres. the better. Much that used to 
he done Informally Is now seen as needing formal mechanisms. Not just 
good scientific management but also good financial kanagement Is 
rightfully demanded. All this is rational and predictable in itself. 
However , it carries with It the debllltatl~g Impact of bureaucracy on 
research. Boards therefore have the responsibfllry, in Cheir dealings 
: c ’ -_’ \ 
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“Then it’s agreed. The Directors General go 
to Heaven, the Boar& go to Hell, and TAC 
goes to arbitration. I’ 
“J 
* . . 
with the secretariats, TX and the CGXAR, to. try to keep the 9rocl*th of.. 
bureaucracy to its mInimum necessary level consfstent with effective 
performance of the System. 
4.5. Induction of New Board Members 
Rather than being left to find their own feet, new Board members 
should & Inducted to the Centxe and, if they are novices, to the 
system. Responslblllty for such induction should:lie largely with the 
Board’s Chairperson assfsted by the Secretary to the Board. 
Rechanisms,to be used should include: (a) the provision, before 
membership l.s finalized, of information on Board time requirements, 
responslbllltles and conditions of service (noting, in particular, that 
membership ls not an honorific affair but a contractual obligation); and 
(b) once membership is accepted, a letter of welcome from the Chairperson 
reiterating the Importance of membership, supplemented by documentary 
lnformatlon on the Centre (latest Annual Repart, Lam-term Plan, etc.) and 
on the System (an appropriate CGIAR booklet Is needed) together with a 
copy of the Centre’s Board Handbook (as outlined ln Section 4.8.1 below). 
As well, new members might advantageously be designated sufficiently ln 
advance to enable them to attend a Board meeting as observers. This Is 
particularly helpful for novices. So too can be attendance at an Internal 
Program Review soon after joining. At their first meeting, new members 
should also be briefed and somewhat looked after by the Chairperson so as 
to better ensure their participation. h already happens at a majority of 
Centres, new members might also learn best about the Centre and its 
actlvltles by belng members of the Program Committee for their first 
year. Other possible avenues of Induction are to be found In the array of 
brleflng methods used by the Centres as listed in the CGIAR Secretariat’s 
paper (1986. p. 92) on Joards and their membership. 
It ls not suggested here that the System should Introduce a formal 
training program for new Board members - if new members need special 
tralnlng to cod& aboard. IPSO facto the selection procedure must be 
00 
Inadequate and the wrong people are being selected. Boards being .. 
expensive enough already, far better to select competent people without a 
need for special training. There could, however, be substantial System 
benefit if the System’s executive training program occasionally involved a 
Board Chairperson or an up-and-coming Board member. 
4.6. Heetinqs of the Board 
The Erequency , locat Ion and conduct of its meetings are lmpor tant 
Ingredients to a Board’s eEfectiveness. 
4.6.1. Frequency 
Cketings should be held at sufffcient frequency to enable &he Board 
Co discharge its responsibflfties effectively. There should be at least 
an annual meeting and, as circumstances warrant (for example, In an 
external review year), special meetings. However, a Board may frequently , 
If not regularly, need two meetlngs In a year to do its work 
effectively.* Most Centres have activities that are so diverse and 
wlde-flung that It Is difficult to believe that the contact provided by 
just an annual meeting of the Board can always be sufficient. If this is 
l The need for caution In not having an excessive number of Board and 
standing cmittee meetings has been well put by Les Sulndale In a letter 
to me of June 1987. He says: 
. 
‘In CGIAR arithmetic two plus one Board meetings and two or three 
Executive CocPmittee meetings will quickly add up to six. Because of the 
distances Involved each meeting will have to be of two to three days’ 
duration to make It worth attending. Research doesn’t progress fast 
enough to merit that much attention so the Board will find ItselE 
Eocussing on management issues. amplifying the trivial. requestlng more 
reports and feasiblllty studies from the staff and fixing things that 
ain’t broke. None af’ this is going to make these cfficlent Institutes 
significantly better. And It will be costly In time of Board members, In 
money. and in time of the small management teams the Centers will 
continue to have. Our Board members will all need to be retired 
persons ! Dillonesque? More likely Parklnsonian. Please recall also 
that there are novt\tuo meetlngs per year of the CC and two or three 
meetings Of TAC for which the Board Chairperson and the Director General 
must prepare and attend.” 
done by supplementing the single Board meeting by Executive Committee 
meetings, the question must be asked if the Board has delegated too much 
oE its responsibility to the Executive Committee. The answer to this 
queStion depends in part on the relative cost of Board and Executive 
Cumnittee. meetings. xf costs dictate only a single Board meeting per 
year, then other avenues of maintaining contact between the Centre and 
Board members during the year must be considered - for example, a 
Trustees Newsletter from the Director General or the participation of 
Board members in a relevant workshop orgtinlzed-by the Centre. or mid-term 
standing committee activities. 
4.6.2. LocatIon 
For Centres with a commodity or regionally oriented mandate, most 
meetings of the Board should be held at Centre headquarters. It is the 
hub of the Centre’s activity and can best service a Board meeting. 
Occasionally, however, so as to enhance members ’ knowledge of the 
Centre’s work or to highlight the Centre's act4vity in a particular 
region, Board a#eetings should be held away from headquarters. As with 
the frequency of meetings. costs and likely benefits should be considered 
iri the choice of location. For such Centres, perhaps once In every three 
to five meetings would be about the right proportion of meetings away 
Craa headquarters, depending on the extent to which other Board 
activities (such as those of the Program Committee) give members 
familiarity with non-headquarters activities. For those Centres not 
having a commodity or regional mandate, a case might well be made Eor 
having a higher proportion of Board meetings away from headquarters so as 
to allow more direct Interaction with the Centre’s clientele. 
4.6.3. Conduct 
The conduct of Board meetlngs lies in the hands of the Chairperson. 
Styles differ Erom the very formal to the Dlllonesque. Tradition In the 
System Is that decisions (except on membership matters) be based on 
consensus rayher than formal vote counting - the latter would probably 
make Life easier for the Chairperson but could lead to undesired 
divisions. 
To'make sure that meetings are as successful as possible, the 
Chaf rperson should ensure that: 
(b) 
(cl 
(dJ 
(el 
ffl 
(d 
fhJ 
the agenda is adequately prepared (suitable item headings, in 
sequence, for a regular mting would be Adoption of the Agenda, 
Minutes, Business Arising, Chairperson's ReP,qC, DIrector General’s 
Report, Reports of Coxa~ttees, staff xaccers.'-Financial Hatters, 
Board Hatters, Future Heetings, Any Other Business). 
the agenda 1s adequately documented and items of a conf1dentfal 
nature to be considered in closed session are clearly indicated. 
agenda documents are distributed to members in good tinhe. 
he or she Is ddeqUdCE?ly briefed, as need be, by the Director General. 
a pre-planned time schedule (distinguishing open and closed 
sessions) is announced and followed for the coverage of items. 
Board, or if not specified, cofmnonsense rules of procedure are 
followed. 
neither he nor she nor any other member dominates the discussion. 
all members and observers (including relevant staff) have the chance 
and dre asked to contrfbute ds dpproprIdte. 
he or she runs ,the meeting. 
courtesy and cool heads prevail, and a spirit of goodwilled 
cooperation pervades the meeting. 
drqft minutes of adequate scope (i.e., reflecting discussion, 
recording decisions and documenttng reports and other documents 
considered) are distributed co members within a month of the 
meeting. 
4.7. Observers to the Board 
At the dtsctetion of the ChaIrperson and the Board, preferably 
following consultation with the Director General, various types of 
observers might ‘Be lnvi ted to attend meetings of the Board and/or, as 
-I ..,’ 
dppropriatc. of i es sticomni ttees . Observers m ight include: 6fficets 
oE the TAC or CCIAR Secretariats; members of TAC (in particular the T&C 
member designated for liaison with the Centre): representatives of 
donors, client countries or relevant national, regional or international 
institutions; consultants to the Board or Centre: potential appointees to 
the Board invited to attend (at Board expense) either to assess their 
merit and/or as part of their induction: If current, members of the 
Centre’s external reviews: members of the Centre’s Management and staff: 
and others of relevance as circumstances dictate. Of course, not all the 
above types of observers will attend every Boara meeting. Most usual, 
apart E rom  relevant members of the Centre’s Management and staff, would 
be observers Prom some of the Centre’s donors and from ,TAC, the TAC 
Secretariat and the CGIAR Secretariat - of whom perhaps there may be half 
a dozen or so in all. 
The major benefit to observers Is the on-the-spot understanding of 
the Centre and Its Board that they (and their sponsors) gain from  
attendance. That Is doubtless why they are interested in attending. But 
the Board too can gain from  their attendance by ensuring that, within the 
constraints of time and relevance, they are not silent but contributing 
observers. To this end. In welcoming observers to open sessions of the 
Board meeting, the Chairperson should specifically Invite their active 
participation and, towards the end oE the meeting, give them  the 
opportunity to make any further comments they m ight wish. As 
appropriate, subconrm itee chairpersons should do the same. 
The groundrules for observers are sim ple. They should remember 
they are present by fnvi Cation, respect the chair, and recognize that - 
unless speclfdcally advised otherwise - a their tnvf tatf on extends only to 
open sesstons of the aord and/or its subconnn2ftees. 
4.8. InfOrmatiOn Needs of the Wsrd 
A  Board can function successfully only if it has adequate 
Inform t~on. In particular about its Own Centre but also about the CGIAR 
tt 
r&J . . . 
system. A sound knowledge base is essential to the making of good . . 
decls ions. Chief sources of information to the Board on an OngOing 
basis are its Chairperson. Secretary and, especially, Director General. 
These three officers of the Board have a responsibility to keep members 
informed of relevant developments in the Centre and the System, Much 
information will also be gained in less formal ways such as newsletters. 
field visits, contacts with Centre staff, discussions with TAC and CGIAR 
Secretariat observers at Board meetings, etc. 
.- 
me  lnftlative in making sure members receive pertinent fnformation 
should 1 ie. with tie Chairperson. Some information, such as reports on 
meetings of the Coaaaittec of Board Chairpersons. will come direct from 
him or her. Other inEormation will need to be arranged, at the 
Chairperson’s request or under a  standing arrangement, by the Director 
General  or Secretary to the Board who, of course, must be expected to be 
of such competence as to also take initiatives In providing relevant 
inforamion. Zn all this, once again, good rapport between the 
Chatrperson and the Director Genizral is crucial because the Board is 
highly dependent on the good will of the Director General for its access 
to up-to-date information about the Centre and its programs. He or she 
controls the staff or other resources on  which the provision of 
InformatIon depends.  I 
4.8.1. Board Handbook 
Bach Cen tre should have (and update annual 1 yI a loose-leaf Board 
Handbook to serve as a reference manual for Board members.  Its content 
should encompass:  an ousline of the CGIAR System: the current CtXAR 
Directory: the Centre’s background: the Centre’s documents of governance 
( inc lud lng By- laws 1: information on Board members (Including past 
members) ; terms of reference of Board standing cornml:tees: statements of 
duties and responsibilit ies of Board oEElcers: members’ Committee 
ass ignfnents; a  summary of Board resolutions and decisions to date: 
information on Board travel and Insurance arrangements, honoraria and 
al lowances: and’&her relevant reference documents such as the Hardin 
*’ , ’ 
(1984) paper. An example of the possible detailed contents of such a _, 
Board Handbook is provided in Appendix 4. 
4.9. Resource Needs of the Board 
The major direct resource needs of a Board are a Secretary (who 
should be a high-level staff member as discussed In Section 4.2.4 above) 
and Elnance to cover the direct cost of its operation (travel costs, 
honoraria and sundry direct expenses such.as secretarial costs, etc.). 
As well, the Board has significant Indirect costs in terms of Hanagement 
and staff time and Centre facilities used in servicing Board needs (e.g., 
documentation for meetings, transport for field visits, social functions, 
programs for spouses, etc.). The Board. and >ts members Individually, 
should be cognizant of these costs and the opportunities foregone 
(particularly in research) that they imply. Costwise, the Board must 
practdse self-regulation both to save money and to set the example of 
cost effectfveness. At the same time, the Board fs essential to the 
Centre and the Sys tern. Its effective (repeat, effective) functlon~ng 
should not be constrained by cost considerations. 
Cost consciousness and effectiveness are helped by a knowledge of 
likely costs and benefits. To this end, a Board should now and again 
look at a breakdown of the costs (both direct and indirect) involved In 
its operation and make a judgement of their reasonableness. The same 
requirement, of course, applies to the suggestions made In this paper. 
It Is filled with statements that a Board “should” do this or that. In 
assessing the merit oE these “shoulds”, apart from other considerations. 
every one should be seen as beginning not with an S but with a $. 
Indeed, all this raises another question not tackled here: How 1s the 
effectiveness of a Board best measured? Probably the answer Is that it 
can only be done via sub?erriv2 ass2ssment by particular peopl2 regarded 
as competent to judge. 
Just as with the provision oE documentation, the Board Is largely 
in the hands CM f ts Director enera for i ts resource needs. The better 
il ‘I - 
the relatfonship between the Board (particularly its Chktrpersonl and' 
the Director General, the better these needs are likely to be met. As 
Hubert Zandstra (CGIAR, 1986a, p. 253) commented at International 
Centres’ Week in 1986, “no matter what kind of [Centre] Board, its 
functionality continues to be a function of or at least dependent to a 
great extent on Centre Management.” 
5. EPILOGUE : 
Maxims, like Boards, should represent “the condensed good sense of 
nations’ (Sir James Xackintosh). It seems appropriate, therefore, to end 
this paper with some such afterwords by (in most cases) persons greater 
than I. 
ON BOARD UEHBWSHIP 
“Few things are impossible to diligence and skill.” 
(Samuel Johnson) 
“People who make no noise are dangerous.” 
(Fontaine) 
‘The empty vessel makes the greatest sound.” 
(Shakespeare) 
“Old men won’ t do. Don’t monopollse the toilet If you’re constipated. 
Get off the seat.” 
c 
(Deng Xiaoping) 
ON BOARD RE!%ONS~BILITY 
‘Ran(agement] must not check reason by tradition. but rather, must check 
tradition by reason.” 
w 
(Tolstoy) 
“Labor can do nothing Athout capital, capital nothing without labor ,, and 
neither labor or capital can do anything without the guiding genius of 
management: and management, however wise its genius, can do nothing 
without the privileges which the [CGIAR] community affords.” 
(U L Mackenzie King) 
‘Cod gives nuts to those who have no teeth.” 
(Spanish proverb) 
“Nature Elts all her children with something to do: 
He who would [manage] and can’t [manage], can surely review.” 
(J R Lowell) 
“Just in proportion as he [or she] is sentient and restless, just in 
proportion as he [or she] reacts and reciprocates and penetrates, is the 
critic a valuable instrument.” 
(Henry James) 
“Plre is the best of servants, but what a master!” 
(Carlyle) 
‘We rust remember not to judge any public servant by any one act, and 
especially should we beware of attacking the men who are merely the 
occasions and not the causes of disaster.” 
(Theodore Roosevelt) 
‘Before we blame, we should first see if we can’t excuse.” 
(G C Lichtenberg) 
‘There is, however. a limit at which forebearance ceases to be a virtue.” 
(Edmund Burke) 
“coed performance multiplies donor expectations.” 
** (DIllon) 
74 . . 
“At absolute worst. the CGIAR could waste $200 III in a year (and die).’ 
Some agencies manage this every year (and Live).” 
(Dillon) 
ON BOARD FUNCTIONING 
‘Ye will [not] take the good ~111 for the deed.” 
: 
(Rabelais) 
‘History is made while household duties are neglected.“’ 
(Burmese proverb) 
-There’s too much abstract willing, purposing, 
In this poor world. we talk by aggregates. 
And think by systems, and being used to face 
Our evils in statistics, are inclined 
To cap them with unreal remedies 
Drawn out in haste.” 
(Elizabeth Barrett Browning) 
“All greatness Is unconscious, or it is little and naught.” 
(Carlyle) 
‘Perfection is reserved for the Gods.’ 
(Monty Yudelman) 
‘You can’t win If you make the wrong mistakes.” 
(Yogi Berra) 
'If thou art a master. be sometimes blind: If a servant, sometimes deaf.” 
(Thomas Fuller) 
‘Always do right. This ~111 gratify some people and astonish the rest.” 
* (Mark Twain) 
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hpPBNoIx 1: .An Example Statement of Terms of Reference and Operational ‘. 
Prccedures for a Program Ccmmittee. 
THE PROSRAM CGXHITTEE 
1. - OF REFERENCE 
The Program Comrmittee Is an advisory panel to the Board of Trustees. 
The members and chairperson are nominated annually-by the Board 
Chairperson for Board approval. Its functions and operational norms are 
set by the Board In the light of the responsibilities and mandate of the 
Board Itself. ’ 
The Program ccxmalttee provides advice to the Board on: 
(a) the suitability of CIAT’s mandate: 
(b) the relevance of CIAT’s research and training activities judged 
in relation to the importance of the problems being tackled, the 
appropriateness of the strategy being followed and Its 
complementarlty to national efforts and those of other 
international or regional Institutions: 
(c) the scientific quality of CIAT’s research (If-need be, making 
use of the services of outside scientific personnel to assist 
with such monitoring); 
(d) CIAT’s linkages with other relevant institutions, particularly 
ln terms of the efficacy of working relationships and 
collaborative efforts with other Centers of the CCXAR System, 
and also in relation to other reglcnal and international 
lnstltutlons in the worldwide research system: 
(cl CLAT’s relations with beneflclary countries and the impact on * 
them of the Center’s work: and 
if) any otner matters or program relevance referred to ic by the 
Board. 
2. OP!3EATICNAL PRCCTlXRSS OF l!FE PRCSRXY CC?F?lTTTSZ 
A. Internal Prosram Review 
The main activity of the Program Committee has been Its participation 
in the annual Internal Program Review and the pr_eparation of a report for 
consideration by the Board. Present procedures-are that one.program 1s 
selected every year for In-depth review, while all other programs receive 
somewhat less attention. Program Committee members may want to keep in 
mind the following questions as suggestive of the policy Issues on which 
they should develop Informed judgements: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
1. 
5. 
What are the ultimate socioeconomic problems (production, 
nutrition, etc.) to which the research Is directed? why are 
they important problems? 
What are the main research results produced since’the last 
.4 
comprehensive review? 
Uhat is known of the relation of these results to the 
socioeconomic problems to which the research Is directed? 
What are the more immediate technical research problems that 
prompted the program? How have these changed since the last 
comprehensive review? Why are they important? 
Is the research strategy appropriate In relation to the selected 
tcsoarch gccbl.ams? Ooes Ct maximize the potential 
complementarity of CIAT’s work with that being developed by 
other institutions inside and outside the CCIAR system? 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
LO. 
\ 
IS the research program correctly balanced in relation to 
geographic regions, alternative beneficiaries and types of 
actlvi t les? 
Is the program of good scientific quality? Are there areas of 
research that could be scientifically strengthened? 
What Is the expected time horizon of the major program 
components? - .m 
Which problems will receive priority attention ln the next three 
years? .Are new activities under consideration? If so, Is CIAT 
the best institution for the work? Vhat is being done on the 
subject by national programs and other Institutions worldwide. 
especially other international Centers? 
Has the program developed appropriate working and scientific 
relationships with beneficiary countries? Are these countries 
taking advantage of available research results and really 
beneflttlng from them? 
8. _P-xedures for the Preparation of the Proqram Committee’s Report 
i Togram Committee’s Report Is prepared for consideration and 
endor : by the Board. Xn this way, It serves several purposes, viz.: 
to inform the Board on program development; 
t to make suggestions and recommendations to management: and 
(c) to put before the Board specific decisions that are required In 
relation to program matters. 
This process requires close collaboration and interchange of ideas 
with management and staff. In order to achieve this, the following 
procedure has been agreed upon: 
n 
1. ?lanagement will provide Program committee members with relevant 
documentation as scan as possible before the Internal Program 
Review. 
2. The Program Ccmmittee will meet during the Internal Program 
Review in order to reach an agreement in relation to the general 
tone of the report, main policy issues identified and tentative 
recumnendations. 
w  
- 
3. The full Cmittee will meet at the end of the review process 
. with the Director General and the Deputy Directors General In 
order to discuss the general lines of the report and provide 
them with an opportunity for reacting and clarifying major 
points. 
4. On this basis the chairperson of the Program Cou&ttee will 
prepare a draft report and send it to Program Committee members 
and to the Director General for their comments. The Director 
General will consult with appropriate staff as he sees 
necessary. Program Leaders will be specifically asked to 
correct any factual errors. 
5. Yith these Inputs the chairperson of the Program Committee will 
draft a second version for consideration of the Executive 
Coaualttee as an Input to Its budgetary deliberations. 
6. After the Executive Committee meeting, the chairperson of the 
Program Committee will prepare a final version for consideration 
of the Board. 
3. X!N’ITORINC SF’?CTRL PSOJWTS 
The Program Committee monitors the role of special projects Vls-a-v& 
the core program of the Center. 
t 
Special projects that substitute for core activities already approved 
by the Board, but for which no core resources are available, or are 
clearly within the mandate of CIAT and complement core activities, can be 
approved by the Director General without further Program Cormnittee or 
Board action. Copies of all formal requests, however, should be forwarded 
to all members of the Trogram Committee and the Chairperson of the Board. 
In the case of special projects for activities which do not meet the 
above criteria, the Director General may lnltiate’actlons leading to the 
formulation of a project with the proviso that the Program Committee 
members and .the Chairperson of the Board be Informed of the nature and 
scope of the proposed special project at the time that the Director 
General Initiates CIAT-Internal action to have a formal project proposal 
drawn up. The Program Committee must Indicate its concurrence before a 
formal request to a potential donor is made. 
Resolution adopted at Meeting XXV of the hard (1986). 
SOURCE: CIAT (1986, pp. 90-92). 
r  
A P P E N N X  2 :. m  Zxanq le  S ta te m e n t spec’,f’/4 L n g  Respons ib iL i t i e&  a n d  
Funct icns fo r  a n  A u d i t Cczmit tee.  
T H E  A U D IT C C X M X T E E  
T h e  m e m b e r s  a n d  cha i rpe rson  o f th e  A u d i t Cc.mi t tee a re  n c m h a trd 
annua l l y  by  th e  B o a r d  Cha i rpe rson  fo r  B o a r d  approva l .  
1 . R R S P C N S IB IL ITIE S  .m  .- 
(a )  P rov ide  assis tance to  th e  B o a r d  o f Trus tees in  ful f i l l ing Its 
fiduc ia ry  responsib i l i t ies  re la t ing to  th e  a c c o u n tin g . investment ,  
in te rna l  c o n trols a n d  r e p o r tin g  pract ices o f th e  C e n te r . 
(b )  M a intain, th r o u g h  regu la r  c o n fid e n tia l  m e e tin g s , a  d i rect  l ine  o f 
c a u m u n l c a tlo n  b e tween  th e  B o a r d  a n d  th e  ex terna l  a u d i to rs  a n d  th e  
in terna l  a u d i tors. 
(c)  E n s u r e  th a t investments a r e  m a d e  wi th in th e  es tab l ished pol icy. 
(4)  E n s u r e  th a t th e  a c c o u n ts a n d  financ ia l  s ta tements  a re  p roper ly  
a u d i te d  by  a n  In d e p e n d e n t pub l i c  a c c o u n ta n t a n d  annua l l y  r e c o r r P n e n d  
th e  select ion o f th e  pub l ic  a c c o u n tin g  firm  as  th e  C e n te r’s a u d i to r . 
(c)  E n s u r e  th e  integri ty a n d  c o o p e r a tio n  o f th e  C e n te r’s m a n a g e m e n t In  
car ry ing  o u t th e  a p p r o v e d  pol ic ies a n d  object ives.  
2 . F U N C P IO N S  
(a )  Rev iew o f resul ts fo r  p rev ious  yea r  wi th th e  chief  financ ia l  o ffice :. 
(b)  E x p l a n a tio n  o f s igni f icant  c h a n g e s  f rom p reced ing  year .  
, 
(c)  Cons ide ra tio n  o f th e  a d e q u a c y  o f d isc losure.  
* 
(e) 
(f) 
(9) 
(h) 
(I) 
(1) 
(k) 
(1) 
08) 
(n) 
(0) 
Consideration of the effect of any changes h accountin pOlicY* . . 
Consideration of the internal and external auditors’ reports and of 
nanagement’s response. 
Report on any problem areas or sensitive matters raised in the 
auditors ’ reports. 
Review of proposed audit objectives, plan an4 fees for current year .- 
of external auditor. 
Review of internal audit objectives and plan for current year. 
Review Center’s use of external auditor firm for non-audit services 
to determine effect on Independence. 
Discussion with external auditors, with no Center employees present. 
of the competence and cooperation of the Center’s accounting and 
audit staff, and of the soundness of their policies and practices. 
Discussion with the Internal auditor on the competence of, and 
relationship with, the external ‘auditors. 
Report by chief financial officer and Director General on 
relationship with external auditors and their recommendation on their 
retention or replacement. 
Discussion and decision by Committee alone on Its recommendation to 
Board on choice of external auditors for next fiscal year. 
Review investments in dstsil with those responsible for their 
preparation. 
Conduct of have conducted any special reviews as the Board of 
Trustees may direct. 
. . . - 
(p) &view Canter ?olicLes with respect to use of funds or other assets 
in conflicts of Interest and recommend changes In policies where 
appropriate. 
(q) Review of any legal problems. 
c  
Resolution adopted at Meeting Xx of the Board (1982); amended version 
adopted at Fleeting XXIV of the Eoard (1985). 
. . .- 
SOURCE: CIAT (1986, pp. 93-94). 
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APPENDIX 3: W I RXaRQle Statement specifying the Role of an Executive 
Ccmmittee. 
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
The Executive Committee of the CIAT Board shall comprise the 
Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, the Director General, the Director General 
of the fnstltuto colombiano Agropecuarlo (ICA) and three additional Board 
members, Including the chairpersons of major committees of the Board. 
Wnbers will be nominated annually by the Chairperson and confirmed by the 
full Board. The Chairperson of the Board will serve as Chairperson of the 
Executive Committee. Four Executive Committee members, Including the 
Chairperson, shall comprise a quorum. 
The Executive cormulttee shall conduct business on behalf of the Board 
when it Is neither practical nor efficient for the full Board to meet, or 
when Items have been referred to It by the Board. It will serve In an 
advisory role to the full Board in matters relating to budget and 
f lnance. It will Identify Issues that should be brought to the attention 
of the Board and Its camulttees and may serve to assist In setting agendas 
for the ‘full Board. It shall otherwise not have separate functions or 
distinct duties and responslbllltles. 
Mnutes of meetings of the Executive Committee shall be circulated to 
all Board members and be maintained by the Board Secretary as part of the 
regular files of the Board. On the recommendation of the Board. these 
m inutes, like those of the full Board. may be deposited In the CGIAR 
Secretariat. 
Resolution oaopted at fleetlng XXIII or’ the O,oard (1384). 
SWRCE : CIAT (1986, p. 89). 
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